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Abstract 
 
 
Is inequality largely the result of the Industrial Revolution? Or, were pre-industrial 
incomes and life expectancies as unequal as they are today?  For want of sufficient data, 
these questions have not yet been answered. This paper infers inequality for 14 ancient, 
pre-industrial societies using what are known as social tables, stretching from the Roman 
Empire 14 AD, to Byzantium in 1000, to England in 1688, to Nueva España around 
1790, to China in 1880 and to British India in 1947. It applies two new concepts in 
making those assessments – what we call the inequality possibility frontier and the 
inequality extraction ratio. Rather than simply offering measures of actual inequality, we 
compare the latter with the maximum feasible inequality (or surplus) that could have 
been extracted by the elite. The results, especially when compared with modern poor 
countries, give new insights in to the connection between inequality and economic 
development in the very long run. 
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1. Good Questions, Bad Data? 
 
 Is inequality largely a byproduct of the Industrial Revolution? Or, were pre-
industrial incomes and life expectancies as unequal as they are today? How does 
inequality in today’s least developed, agricultural countries compare with that of ancient 
societies dating back to the Roman Empire? Did some parts of the world always have 
greater income inequality than others? Was inequality augmented by colonization? These 
questions have not been answered yet, for want of sufficient data. Our effort to gather 
these data has not been easy, even though we were well warned of the pitfalls facing any 
attempt to explore pre-industrial income gaps between rich and poor. 
 Simon Kuznets was very skeptical of attempts to compare income inequalities 
across countries when he was writing in the 1970s. In his view, the early compilations 
assembled by the International Labor Organization and the World Bank referred to 
different population concepts, different income concepts, and different parts of the 
national economy. To underline his doubts, Kuznets once asked (rhetorically) at a 
University of Wisconsin seminar “Do you really think you can get good conclusions from 
bad data?”  Economists with interest in inequality are indebted to Kuznets for his sage 
warning.1 We are even more indebted to Kuznets for violating his own warning when, 
earlier in his career, he famously conjectured about his Kuznets Curve based on a handful 
of very doubtful inequality observations.  His 1954 Detroit AEA Presidential Address 
mused on how inequality might have risen and fallen over two centuries, and theorized 
about the sectoral and demographic shifts that might have caused such movements.  Over 
                                                 
1
 His Wisconsin seminar paper became a classic (Kuznets 1976). 
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the last half century, economists have responded enthusiastically to his postulated 
Kuznets Curve, searching for better data, better tests, and better models.    
 As we have said, Kuznets based his hypothetical Curve on very little evidence. 
The only country for which he had good data was the United States after 1913, on which 
he was the data pioneer himself.  Beyond that, he judged earlier history from tax data 
taken from the United Kingdom since 1880 and Prussia since 1854 (1955, p. 4). For these 
three advanced countries, incomes had become more unequal between the late nineteenth 
century and the 1950s.  He presented no data at all regarding earlier trends, yet bravely 
conjectured that “income inequality might have been widening from about 1780 to 1850 
in England; from about 1840 to 1890, and particularly from 1870 on in the United States; 
and from the 1840’s to the 1890’s in Germany” (1955, p. 19).  For poor, pre-industrial 
countries, he had only household surveys for India 1949-1950, Sri Lanka 1950, and 
Puerto Rico 1948 (1955, p. 20).  These are all bad data judged by the standards Kuznets 
himself applied in the 1970s.  They are also bad data judged by the modern World Bank 
standards since those three surveys from the mid-20th-century would now be given low 
grades on the Deininger-Squire scale assessing the quality of income distribution data 
(Deininger and Squire, 1996: pp. 567-71).  Meanwhile, world inequalities have also 
changed. The convergence of incomes within industrial countries that so impressed 
Kuznets has been reversed, and the gaps have widened again.   
We have reason, therefore, to ask anew whether income inequality was any 
greater in the distant past than it is today. This paper offers five conjectures about 
inequality patterns during and since ancient pre-industrial times: 
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(1) Income inequality must have risen as hunter-gathers slowly evolved into 
ancient agricultural settlements with surpluses above subsistence. Inequality rose 
further as economic development in these early agricultural settlements gave the 
elite the opportunity to harvest those rising surpluses.  
(2) Yet, the evidence suggests that the elite failed to exploit their opportunity fully 
since income inequality did not rise anywhere near as much as it could have. 
While potential inequality rose steeply over the very long run, actual inequality 
rose much less.   
(3) In ancient pre-industrial times, inequality was driven largely by the gap 
between the rural poor at the bottom and the landed elite at the top. The 
distribution of income among the elite themselves, and their share in total income, 
contributed far less to overall inequality, and never consistently. 
(4) Ancient pre-industrial inequality seems to have been lower in East Asia than it 
was in the Middle East, Europe, or the world as settled by Europeans, suggesting 
long period persistence in region-specific distributions.   
(5) While there is little difference in conventionally measured inequality between 
modern and ancient pre-industrial societies, there are immense differences in two 
other, less conventional, dimensions. First, the share of potential inequality 
actually achieved today is far less than was true of pre-industrial times. Second, 
life expectancy inequality was far greater two centuries ago than it is today. The 
decline in survival inequality in the twentieth century has contributed mightily to 
the convergence of lifetime incomes in the world economy. 
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 Our data are subject to all the concerns that bothered Kuznets, other economists, 
and the present authors. Our income inequality statistics exploit fragile measures of 
annual household income, without adjustment for taxes and transfers, life-cycle patterns, 
or household composition. None of our ancient inequality observations would rate a “1” 
on the Deininger-Squire scale. Yet, like Gregory King in the 1690s and Simon Kuznets in 
the 1950s, we must start somewhere. Section 2 begins by introducing some new concepts 
that we use for the analysis -- the inequality possibility frontier and the inequality 
extraction ratio, measures of the extent to which the elite extract the maximum feasible 
inequality. These new measures open the door to fresh interpretations of inequality in the 
very long run. The next section presents our ancient inequality evidence. Section 4 
examines income gaps between top and bottom, and the extent to which observed 
inequality change over the very long run is driven by those gaps as opposed to the 
distribution of income among those at the top or the top’s income share. Section 5 
explores how the stylized facts are changed when conventional annual income measures 
are replaced by lifetime income measures. We conclude with a research agenda. 
 
2. The Inequality Possibility Frontier 
 
 The workhorse for our empirical analysis of ancient inequalities is a concept we 
call the inequality possibility frontier. While the idea is simple enough, it has surprisingly 
been overlooked by past authors. Suppose that each society, including ancient non-
industrial societies, has to distribute income in such a way as to guarantee subsistence 
minimum for its poorer classes. The remainder of the total income is the surplus that is 
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shared among the richer classes. When average incomes are very low, and barely above 
the subsistence minimum, the surplus is small. Under those primitive conditions, the 
members of the upper class will be few, and the level of inequality will be quite modest. 
But as average incomes increase with economic progress, this constraint on inequality is 
lifted; the surplus increases, and the maximum possible inequality compatible with that 
new, higher, average income is greater. In other words, the maximum attainable 
inequality is an increasing function of mean overall income. Whether the elite fully 
exploit that maximum, and whether some trickle-down allows the subsistence minimum 
to rise, is, of course, another matter entirely. 
 To fix ideas intuitively, suppose that a society consists of 100 people, 99 of whom 
are lower class. Assume further that the subsistence minimum is 10 units, and total 
income 1050 units. The 99 members of the lower class receive 990 units of income and 
the only member of the upper class receives 60. The Gini coefficient corresponding to 
such a distribution will be only 4.7 percent. If total income improves over time to 2000 
units, then the sole upper class member will be able to extract 1010 units, and the 
corresponding Gini coefficient will leap to 49.5 percent. If we chart the locus of such 
maximum possible Ginis on the vertical axis against mean income levels on the 
horizontal axis, we obtain the inequality possibility frontier (IPF).2 Note also that by 
virtue of the fact that any progressive transfer must reduce inequality measured by the 
Gini coefficient, we know that a less socially-segmented society must result in a lower 
Gini.3 Thus, IPF is indeed a frontier.    
                                                 
2
 The IPF concept was first introduced in Milanovic (2006). 
3
 The reader can verify this by letting one subsistence worker’s income rise above subsistence to 20, and by 
letting the richest person’s income be reduced to 1000. The new Gini would be 49.49.  
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 The inequality possibility frontier can be derived more formally. Define 
s=subsistence minimum, µ=overall mean income, N=number of people in a society, and 
ε=proportion of people belonging to a (very small) upper class. Then the mean income of 
upper class people (yh) will be  
)]1([1)1( εµ
εε
εµ
−−=
−−
= s
N
sNNyh       (1) 
where we assume as before that the (1-ε)N people belonging to lower classes receive 
subsistence incomes.  
 Once we document population proportions and mean incomes for both classes, 
and assume further that all members in a given class receive the same income,4 we can 
calculate any standard measure of inequality from the distribution data. Here we shall 
derive the IPF using the Gini coefficient. 
 The Gini coefficient for n social classes whose mean incomes (y) are ordered in 
an ascending fashion (yj>yi), with subscripts denoting social classes, can be written as in 
equation (2) 
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where πi=proportion of income received by i-th social class, pi=proportion of people 
belonging to i-th social class, Gi=Gini inequality among people belonging to i-th social 
class, and L=the overlap term which is greater than 0 only if there are members of a 
lower social class (i) whose incomes exceed that of some members of a higher social 
class (j). The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) is the within component 
(part of total inequality due to inequality within classes), the second term is the between 
                                                 
4
 This is already assumed for the lower classes, but that assumption will be relaxed later for the upper 
classes. 
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component (part of inequality due to differences in mean incomes between classes) and L 
is, as already explained, the overlap term. 
 Continuing with our illustrative case, where all members of the two social classes 
(upper and lower) have the mean incomes of their respective classes, equation (2) 
simplifies to 
 jiij ppyyG )
1
−(=
µ
         (3) 
Substituting (1) for the income of the upper class, and s for the income of lower class, as 
well as their population shares, (3) becomes 
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where G* denotes the maximum feasible Gini coefficient for a given level of mean 
income (µ). Rearranging terms in (4), we simplify 
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Finally, if we now express mean income as a multiple of the subsistence minimum, µ=αs 
(where α≥1), then (5) becomes 
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 Equation (6) represents our final expression for the maximum Gini which will 
chart IPF as α is allowed to increase from 1 to higher values. For example, when α=1 (all 
individuals receive the same income), (6) reduces to 0 (as we would expect), while when 
α=2, the maximum Gini becomes 0.5(1-ε). Let the percentage of population that belongs 
to the upper class be one-tenth of 1 percent (ε=0.001). Then for α=2, the maximum Gini 
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will be 49.95 (expressed as a percentage).5 The hypothetical IPF curve generated for α 
values ranging between 1 and 5 is shown in Figure 1. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The derivative of the maximum Gini with respect to mean income (given a fixed 
subsistence) is  
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In other words, the IPF curve is increasing and concave. Using (7), one can easily 
calculate the elasticity of G* with respect to α as 1/(α-1). That is, the percentage change 
in the maximum Gini in response to a given percentage change in mean income is less at 
higher levels of mean income. 
 The inequality possibility frontier depends on two parameters, α and ε. In the 
illustrative example used here, we have assumed that ε=0.1 percent. How sensitive is our 
Gini maximum to this assumption? Were the membership of the upper class even more 
exclusive, consisting of (say) 1/50th of one percent of population, would the maximum 
Gini change dramatically? Taking the derivative of G* with respect to ε in equation (6), 
we get 
01* <−=
α
α
εd
dG
         (8) 
Thus, as ε falls (the club gets more exclusive), G* rises. But is the response big? Given 
the assumption that mean income is twice subsistence and that the share of the top 
income class is ε=0.001, we have seen that the maximum Gini is 49.95. But if we assume 
instead that the top income group is cut to one-fifth of its previous size (ε=1/50 of one 
                                                 
5
 As the percentage of people in top income class tends toward 0, G* tends toward (α-1)/α. Thus, for 
example, for α=2, G* would be 0.5 (or 50 percent). 
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percent), the Gini will increase to 49.99, or hardly at all. G* is, of course, bounded by 50. 
For historically plausible parameters, the IPF Gini is not very sensitive to changes in the 
size of the top income class.  
 The assumption that all members of the upper class receive the same income is 
convenient for the derivation of the IPF, but would its relaxation make a significant 
difference in the calculated G*? To find out, we need to go back to the general Gini 
formula given in (2). The within-group Gini for the upper class will no longer be equal to 
0.6  The overall Gini will increase by επhGh where h is the subscript for the upper (high) 
class. The income share appropriated by the upper class is 
 
α
ε
π
−
−=
11h  
and the increase in the overall G* will therefore be 
 ε
α
ε 

 −
−=∆ 11* hGG  .       (9) 
This increase is unlikely to be substantial. Consider again our illustrative example 
where α=2 and ε=0.001. The multiplication of the last two terms in (9) equals 0.0005. 
Even if the Gini among upper classes is increased to 50, the increase in the overall Gini 
(∆G*) will be only 0.025 Gini points. We conclude that we can safely ignore the 
inequality among the upper class in our derivation of the maximum Gini. Inequality 
among the upper class is unlikely to make much difference since the assumed size of the 
top income group is so small to start with. Thus, we think within-group inequality can be 
safely ignored for IPF estimates since almost the entire inequality is due to the between-
                                                 
6
 For the lower class, within-group inequality is zero by assumption since all of its members are taken to 
live at subsistence. 
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group Gini component.7 This inference should not imply a disinterest in actual 
distribution at the top; indeed, we will assess the empirical support for it in section 4. 
 
3. Social Tables and Inequality Measures 
 
 Income distribution data based on household surveys are, of course, unavailable 
for pre-industrial societies. The earliest household surveys of income and expenditures 
date from the late eighteenth century in England and the mid nineteenth century in other 
countries. We believe that the best estimates of ancient inequalities can be obtained from 
what are called social tables (or, as William Petty (1676) called it more than three 
centuries ago, political arithmetick) where various social classes are ranked from the 
richest to the poorest with their estimated population (family or household head) shares 
and average incomes. Social tables are particularly useful in evaluating ancient societies 
where classes were clearly delineated and the differences in mean incomes between them 
were substantial. Theoretically, if class alone determined one’s income, and if differences 
in income within classes were small, then all inequality would be explained by the 
between-class inequality. One of the best examples of social tables is offered by Gregory 
King’s famous estimates for England and Wales in 1688 (Barnett 1936; Lindert and 
Williamson 1982). King’s list of classes summarized in Table 1 is fairly detailed (31 
social classes). King (and others listed in Table 1) did not report inequalities within each 
social class so we cannot identify within-class inequality for 1688 England and Wales or 
for any other of the Table 1 observations. However, within-class inequalities can be 
                                                 
7
 Moreover, in the empirical work below, we shall be using mean incomes of social classes to calculate the 
estimates of ancient inequalities, thus making an assumption equivalent to the one made in the derivation of 
the inequality possibility frontier.  
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roughly gauged by calculating two Gini values: a lower bound Gini1 which estimates 
only the between-group inequality and assumes within-group or within-social class 
inequality to be zero; an upper bound Gini2 which estimates the maximum inequality that 
is compatible with the grouped data from social tables assuming that all individuals from 
a higher social group are richer than any individual from a lower social group. In other 
words, where class mean incomes are such that yj>yi, it also holds true that ykj>ymi for all 
members of group j, where k and m are subscripts that denote individuals. Thus, in 
addition to the between-class inequality component, Gini2 includes some within-class 
inequality (see equation 2), but under the strong assumption that mean incomes for all 
members of a given social class are poorer or richer than those respectively above or 
below them. This strong assumption is unlikely to be fulfilled in any actual social table, 
but it allows us to move beyond an accounting limited only to between-class inequality.8 
In the empirical work that follows, we shall depend almost entirely on social tables or tax 
census data obtained from secondary sources, including some estimates of our own. 
Detailed explanations for each country’s social table are provided in the Appendix 1. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 Table 1 lists 14 ancient pre-industrial societies for which we have calculated 
inequality statistics.9 These societies range from early first-century Rome (Augustan 
Principate) to India just prior to its independence from Britain. Assuming with Angus 
                                                 
8
 Gini2 is routinely calculated when published income distribution data are only reported as fractiles of the 
population and their income shares are the only data given. In that case, of course, any member of a richer 
group must have a higher income than any member of a lower group. This is unlikely to be satisfied when 
the fractiles are not income classes but rather social classes as is the case here. The Gini2 formula is due to 
Kakwani (1980). 
 
9
 Joseph Massie’s famous social tables for 1759 England and Wales are not used here since he did not give 
them in a form consistent with our needs. In addition, we excluded 1752 Jerez (Andalusia) since it was 
primarily an urban observation. In the near future, we expect to augment the sample by adding 1861 Chile, 
1924 Java, late Tokugawa and early Meiji Japan, 1427 Tuscany, 1788 France, Tsarist Russia and others.  
 14 
Maddison an annual subsistence minimum of $PPP 400 per capita,10 and with GDI per 
capita ranging from about $PPP 500 to $PPP 2,000, then α would range from 1.3 to 5. A 
GDI per capita of $PPP 2,000 is a level of income not uncommon today, and it would 
place 1732 Holland or 1801-03 England and Wales in the 40th percentile in the world 
distribution of countries by per capita income in the year 2000. With the possible 
exception of 1732 Holland and 1801-3 England, countries in our sample have average 
incomes that are roughly compatible with contemporary pre-industrial societies that have 
not yet started significant and sustained industrialization. The urbanization rate in our 
sample ranges from less than 10 to 45 percent (the latter, again, for Holland). Population 
size varies even more, from an estimated 983,000 in 1561 Holland to 350 million or more 
in India 1947 and China 1880. Finally, the number of social classes into which 
distributions are divided, and from which we calculate our Ginis, varies considerably. 
They number only three for 1784-99 Nueva España (comprising the territories of today’s 
Mexico, Central America, Cuba and parts of  the western United States) and 1880 China. 
In most cases, the number of social classes is in the double digits. The largest number is 
in Brazil, where the data from the 1872 Brazilian census include 813 occupations. 
The estimated inequality statistics are reported in Table 2. The calculated Ginis 
display a very wide range: from 23.9 in 1880s China to 63.5 in 1784-99 Nueva España. 
The latter figure is higher than the inequality reported for some of today’s most unequal 
countries like Brazil and South Africa (Table 2). The average Gini (using Gini2 where 
available, otherwise Gini1) from these 14 data points is 45.7, while the average Gini from 
the nine modern comparators is 43.3. These are only samples, of course, but there is very 
little difference on average between them, 45.7 (ancient) - 43.3 (modern) = 2.4. In 
                                                 
10
 All dollar data, unless indicated otherwise, are in 1990 Geary-Khamis PPPs.  
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contrast, there are very great differences within each sample: 58.8 (Brazil 2002) - 27.3 
(Sweden 2000) = 31.5 among the modern comparators, while 63.5 (Nueva España 1784-
99) - 24.5 (China 1880) = 39 among the ancient economies. In short, inequality 
differences within the ancient and modern samples is many times greater than the 
difference between them.  
The Gini estimates are plotted in Figure 2 against the estimates of GDI per capita 
on the horizontal axis. They are also displayed against the inequality possibility frontier 
constructed on the assumption of a subsistence minimum of $PPP 400 (solid line).11 In 
most cases, the calculated Ginis lie fairly close to the IPF. In terms of absolute distance, 
the countries falling farthest below the IPF curve are the most “modern” pre-industrial 
economies: England and Wales in 1688 and 1801-3, and Holland in 1732. The maximum 
possible Ginis in these cases range from 72 to 80 while the estimated Ginis are between 
45 and  63. 12  
[Table 2 and Figure 2 about here] 
If we used Maddison’s subsistence level of $400, then four estimated Ginis would 
be significantly greater than the maximum Gini (at their level of income) implied by the 
IPF: three of these are based on data from India, and the fourth is from Nueva España.13 
                                                 
11
 This is based on Maddison’s (1998, p.12) assumed subsistence minimum. Note that a purely 
physiological minimum “sufficient to sustain life with moderate activity and zero consumption of other 
goods” (Bairoch 1993, p.106) was estimated by Bairoch to be $PPP 80 at 1960 prices. Using the US 
consumer price index to convert Bairoch’s estimate to international dollars yields $PPP 355 at 1990 prices.  
Maddison’s estimate allows in addition for expenses above the bare physiological minimum. Our minimum 
is also consistent with the World Bank absolute poverty line which is 1.08 per day per capita in 1993 $PPP 
(Chen and Ravallion 2007, p. 6). This works out to be about $PPP 365 per annum in 1990 international 
prices. Another justification for a subsistence minimum between $PPP 350 and 400 was recently provided 
by Becker, Philipson and Soares (2005), who, in calculation of multidimensional inequality (income times 
life expectancy), use a calibration to transform these two variables into one.   
 
12
 Naples, with very low inequality, also lies deeply inside the Inequality possibility frontier.  
 
13
 The Old Castille is also slightly above the IPF.  
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Recalling our definition of the IPF, these four cases can only be explained by one or more 
of these five possibilities: (i) a portion of the population cannot even afford the 
subsistence minimum, (ii) the actual ε is much smaller than the assumed ε=0.001, (iii) 
inequality within the rich classes is very large, (iv) our estimate of inequality is too high, 
and/or (v) the subsistence minimum is overestimated. We have already analyzed and 
dismissed the first three possibilities. The fourth possibility is unlikely: since our 
estimates of inequality are based only on a few classes, they are likely to be biased 
downwards, not upwards. The last possibility offers the more likely explanation. It could 
well be that the subsistence minimum was less than $PPP 400 for some societies.14 In 
particular, this is likely to be the case for subtropical or tropical regions where calorie, 
housing and clothing needs are considerably less than those in temperate climates. 
Indeed, in his pioneering study of world incomes, Colin Clark (1957, pp. 18-23) 
distinguished between international units (the early PPP dollar) and oriental units, the 
dollar equivalents which presumably hold for Asia and other poor areas but not for the 
rest of the world. If the true subsistence minimum is less than Maddison’s assumed value 
of $PPP 400, the IPF would move upwards (see the new IPF shown by a broken line in 
Figure 2). Thus, the average income of $PPP 800 would no longer be equivalent to 2 
subsistence minima (α=2) but, assuming the subsistence minimum of $PPP 300, the mean 
income of $PPP 800 would amount to α=2⅔. If the IPF is drawn under the s=300 
assumption, it shifts the frontier upwards enough to encompass at or below it all our 
estimated inequalities, with the possible (and modest) exceptions of Moghul India and 
Nueva España.  
                                                 
14
 Another possibility is that our Maddison-based estimates of mean incomes for these four cases are too 
low. If that was true, all four points should be moved horizontally to the right, thus falling inside the IPF. 
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How do country inequality measures compare with the maximum feasible Ginis at 
their estimated income levels? Call the ratio between the actual (measured using Gini2) 
and the maximum feasible inequality the inequality extraction ratio, indicating how much 
of the maximum inequality was actually extracted: the higher the inequality extraction 
ratio, the more (relatively) unequal the society.15 The median ratio in our sample is 94 
percent, the mean 102  percent. The countries with the lowest ratios are 1811 Naples and 
1688 England and Wales (60-62 percent).    
The inequality possibility frontier allows us to better situate these estimates of 
ancient inequality in modern experience. Using the same framework that we have just 
applied to ancient societies, the bottom panel of Table 2 provides estimates of inequality 
in several contemporary societies. Brazil and South Africa have often been cited as 
examples of extremely unequal societies, both driven by long experience with racial 
discrimination, tribal power and regional dualism. Indeed, both countries display Ginis 
comparable to those of the most unequal pre-industrial societies included in our sample. 
But Brazil and South Africa are several times richer than the richest pre-industrial society 
in our sample. Consequently, the maximum feasible inequality is much higher than 
anything we have seen in our ancient sample. Thus, the elite in both countries have 
extracted only about two-thirds of their maximum feasible inequality, and their inequality 
extraction ratios are about the same as what we found for the most egalitarian ancient 
societies (1688 England and Wales, and 1811 Kingdom of Naples).  
In the year 2000, countries near the world median GDI per capita (about $PPP 
3,500) or near the world mean population-weighted GDI per capita (a little over $PPP 
                                                 
15
 The term “relative” is used here, faute de mieux, to denote conventionally calculated inequality in 
relation to maximum possible inequality at a given level of income; not whether the measure of inequality 
itself is relative or absolute.   
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6,000), had maximum feasible Ginis of 89 and 93 respectively. The median Gini in 
today’s world is about 35, having thus extracted just a bit over a third of feasible 
inequality, vastly less than did ancient societies. Using this measure, China’s present 
inequality extraction ratio is 47 percent, while that for the United States is 41 percent, 
and that for Sweden 28 percent. Only in the extremely poor countries today, with GDI 
per capita less than $PPP 600, do actual and maximum feasible Ginis lie close together 
(2003 Nigeria, 2004 Congo D. R., and 2000 Tanzania). Thus, while inequality in 
historical pre-industrial societies is equivalent to that of today’s pre-industrial societies, 
ancient inequality was much greater when expressed in terms of maximum feasible 
inequality. Compared with the maximum inequality possible, today’s inequality is much 
smaller than that of ancient societies.  
Our new measure of inequality (the inequality extraction ratio) may possibly 
reflect more accurately societal inequality, and the role it plays, than does any actual 
measure. This new view of inequality may be more pertinent for the analysis of power in 
both ancient and modern societies. For example, Tanzania (denoted TZA in Figure 3) 
with a relatively low Gini of 35 may be less egalitarian than it appears since measured 
inequality lies so close to (or indeed above) its inequality possibility frontier (Table 2 and 
Figure 3). On the other hand, with a much higher Gini of almost 48, Malaysia (MYS) has 
extracted only about one-half of maximum inequality, and thus is farther away from the 
IPF.  
[Table 2 and Figure 3 about here] 
Another implication of our approach is that it considers jointly inequality and 
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development. As a country becomes richer, its feasible inequality expands. Consequently, 
if recorded inequality is stable, the inequality extraction ratio must fall; and even if 
recorded inequality goes up, the ratio may not. This can be seen in Figure 4 where we 
plot the inequality extraction ratio against GDI per capita. Thus, the social consequences 
of increased inequality may not entail as much relative impoverishment, or as much 
perceived injustice, as might appear if we looked only at the recorded Gini. This logic is 
particularly compelling for poor and middle-income countries where increases in income 
push the maximum feasible inequality up relatively sharply, since the IPF curve is 
concave. The farther a society rises above the subsistence minimum, the less will 
economic development lift its inequality possibility frontier, and thus the inequality 
extraction ratio will be driven more and more by the rise in the Gini itself. This is best 
illustrated by the United States where the maximum feasible inequality already stands at 
a Gini of 98.2. Economic development offers this positive message: the inequality 
extraction ratio will fall with GDI per capita growth even if measured inequality remains 
constant. However, economic decline offers the opposite message: that is, a decline in 
GDI per capita, like that registered by Russia in the early stages of its transition from 
Communism, drives the country’s maximum feasible inequality down. If the measured 
Gini had been stable, the inequality extraction ratio would have risen. If the measured 
Gini rose (as was indeed the case in Russia), the inequality extraction ratio would have 
risen even more sharply. Rising inequality may be particularly socially disruptive under 
these conditions.  
[Figure 4 around here] 
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4. Looking at Different Parts of the Income Distribution 
 
 How much of the inequality observed in ancient societies can be explained by the 
economic distance between the rural landless poor at the bottom and the rich landed elite 
at the top? How much can be explained by the distribution among the elite at the top? 
How much by the share of that elite in the total? 
 
Life at the Top: Income Distribution among the Elite 
An impressive amount of recent empirical work has suggested that the evolution 
of the share of the top 1 percent yields a good approximation to changes in the overall 
income distribution in modern industrial societies (Piketty 2003, 2005; Piketty and Saez 
2003, 2006; Atkinson and Piketty forthcoming). These studies find that most of the action 
takes place at the top of the income distribution pyramid and that differences in the top 1 
percent income share account for much of the differences in overall inequality. These top 
share studies have also been performed on poor pre-modern India (since 1922: Banerjee 
and Piketty 2005), Indonesia (since 1920: Leigh and van der Eng 2006) and Japan (since 
1885: Moriguchi and Saez 2005), but it is important to stress that they do not find this 
result, but rather assume it. So, are differences in the share of the top 1 percent also a 
good proxy for differences in overall income distribution in ancient pre-industrial 
societies?  
The share of top 1 percent is estimated here under the assumption that top 
incomes follow a Pareto distribution. Our approach is basically the same as that recently 
used by Atkinson (forthcoming) and by others writing before him (see the references in 
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Atkinson). The estimation procedure is explained in detail in Appendix 3 where several 
caveats are listed since our social tables are different from the usual income distribution 
data sources.   
 Table 3 reports two key results: the estimated income share of the top 1 percent of 
recipients, and the cut-off point, that is the income level (relative to the mean) where the 
top one percent of recipients begins. The countries are listed in descending order 
according to the top 1 percent share.  In sharp contrast with modern studies, the 
correlation between the top 1 percent share and the Gini is negative, small (-0.13), and 
statistically insignificant. This implies that differences in the top percentile share do not 
reflect differences in overall inequality very well, a result consistent with what we report 
on the average income to rural wage ratio below. Consider, for example, the Roman and 
Byzantine empires. Their estimated Ginis are very similar (39.4 and 41) but the top 
percentile share in Byzantium (30.6, the highest in our sample) is almost twice as great as 
in Rome (16.1). Consider another top-heavy society like China in 1880 where the top 
percentile share of 21.3 is second only to Byzantine 1000, but where the Gini is the 
lowest in the sample (24.5).  
[Table 3 and Figure 5 about here] 
The location of the cut-off point -- where the top percentile begins -- tells us a lot 
about the organization of societies. Figure 5 displays the top percentile share and the cut-
off point (relative to mean income). At one end of the spectrum is the Byzantine Empire 
with a very rich top one percent, but also with an unusually low cut-off point. This would 
seem to indicate the absence of a middle class, that is, of those who would normally fill 
in the “space” between the mean income and (say) an income 3 to 4 times greater than 
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the mean. The results for China display the same pattern.16 On the other hand, the top 
percentile was very rich in the Roman Empire (16.1 percent of total income), but the cut-
off point was very high too: 12.4 times the mean. This suggests a Roman income 
distribution with a long tail of rich people such that the 2nd-5th percentiles were also quite 
rich. This interpretation is supported by Figure 6 which shows the empirical income 
distributions and the estimated top percentile share calculated using the Pareto 
interpolation (see the dashed line).17 While the income share after the first, and up to the 
4th  and the 5th percentile in Byzantium rises very slowly, the line rises more steeply in 
Rome, indicating that Romans in these percentiles were relatively wealthy.  For 
comparative purposes, we also show the English 1801-3 data where the top 1 percent 
share, as well as the steepness of the line after the top percentile, are similar to those of 
Rome. It seems that the main difference among the very rich in Rome 14 and England 
1801-3 was that the people just below the very top of the income pyramid were, relative 
to the mean, somewhat less rich in England than in Rome. Finally, notice that in all three 
cases, the top 5 percent of income recipients received between 30 and just over 40 
percent of total income. In contrast, the top 5 percent received about a quarter of total 
income in modern United States and United Kingdom, while the share is 27 percent in 
modern Chile and a third in Brazil.  
 Table 3 also reports several modern comparators. In all cases but one (Mexico), 
their top 1 percent share is less, and for most cases, much less, than that estimated for our 
                                                 
16
 The Chinese result is driven in part by the available data which focus on the income of Chinese gentry, 
the top 2 percent of the population. 
 
17
 Note that the high intercept of the line indicates a very high income share of the very top (people even 
richer than the top 1 percent).  
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sample of ancient societies. The low top 1 percent share combined with a low cut-off 
point (characteristic of advanced societies) betokens a distribution where, first, the richest 
1 percent are not extravagantly rich (in contrast with the American Bill Gates or the 
Roman Marcus Licinus Crassus), and where, second, they are not very different from the 
rest of the population. Since we have already noted that Gini coefficients between the 
ancient and contemporary poor societies are not very different, this difference in the 
average top 1 percent shares between the ancient and modern implies that the link 
between top income share and overall inequality is not very strong among ancient 
societies.  
  
Life at the Bottom: The Unskilled Rural Wage Relative to Average Income  
For eleven of the fourteen countries in our ancient inequality sample, we can 
measure the economic distance between the landed elite and landless labor by computing 
the ratio of average family income (or average income per recipient, y) to that of landless, 
unskilled rural laborer (w). Figure 7 plots the relation between the overall Gini and the 
y/w ratio (Appendix 2).18 The simple bivariate correlation is positive (standard errors in 
parentheses): 
 Gini =       29.79  +  6.27 y/w,  R2 = 0.51   (n = 11)  
     (4.83)     (3.04) 
 
The estimated relationship also implies an elasticity of the Gini with respect to the y/w 
ratio of 0.4. For every 10 percent increase in y/w, the Gini rose by 4 percentage points. 
Low measured inequalities in China 1880 and Naples 1811 (Ginis of 24.2 and 28.3) were 
consistent with small gaps between poor rural laborers and average incomes (y/w of 1.32 
                                                 
18
 This simple y/w index has been shown to be a good proxy for inequality among nineteenth and twentieth 
century poor economies (Williamson 1997, 2002). 
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and 1.49), or with a rural wage two-thirds to three-quarters of average income. High 
measured inequalities in Nueva España 1784-99 and England 1801-03 (Ginis of 63.5 and 
51.5) were consistent with large gaps between poor rural laborers and average incomes 
(y/w of 2.94 and 4.17), or with a rural wage only one-quarter to one-third of average 
income. There appears to be only one true outlier to the otherwise tight relationship in 
Figure 7, British India in 1947. Still, the overall relationship does suggest that the gap 
between poor landless labor and the landed elite, whose incomes raise the average 
considerably, drives the Gini, not conditions at the top. 
 
5. Unequal Life Expectancy and Lifetime Incomes 
 
Thus far, this paper has followed convention by considering inequality of annual 
income. Yet, differences in the ability to consume should be gauged by lifetime income, 
not just annual income. The fact that some die much younger than others matters in 
gauging inequality, and it matters even more if morbidity and mortality are correlated, so 
that short lives are also low quality lives. How are comparisons between ancient and 
modern pre-industrial societies affected when we adjust for inequality in life expectancy?    
 We are interested in two concepts of life expectancy inequality:  inequality in 
group survival rates, and inequality in individual survival rates. The first speaks to 
debates over the injustice of the rich living longer, while the second speaks to debates 
about the distribution of individual income and consumption. We think it is useful to 
measure historical movements in both kinds of life expectancy inequality, even without 
trying to tote up lifetime consumption levels.   
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 Public interest in group survival rates tends to focus on differences between 
nations, social classes, and genders.19 The difference in average survival between nations 
first rose and then fell over the last five hundred years. Before the sixteenth century, the 
average life span from birth was in the 21-29 year range the world over. Subsequently, 
western Europeans began to undergo an increase in life spans beyond 30 years while the 
rest of the world continued to die younger. This gap between longer-living rich countries 
and others continued to widen until the early twentieth century, thus causing world 
lifetime income inequality to rise more steeply than world annual income inequality. 
Over the past century, the life span gap between poor and rich countries has narrowed 
dramatically. Despite current concern about infectious diseases in poor countries, the fact 
is that spectacular progress has already been made there.   
 The resulting transformation in international inequalities is illustrated by Figure 8, 
which plots average life expectancies at birth (e0) against GDP per capita. The two e0 
curves with black markers trace out long histories for England and Wales (later, the 
United Kingdom) since the late sixteenth century and France since the early eighteenth 
century. British and French citizens, and those in the rest of Western Europe, were, of 
course, much richer and lived much longer than their distant ancestors. The same has also 
been true of the Japanese since the early nineteenth century, even though they have 
always lived longer than Western Europeans at similar incomes. The distinction between 
                                                 
19
 On the gender front, we will only note that since about 1800, females have outlived males throughout the 
world.  Before then, the gender life balance could tip either way. Males outlived females in some, but not 
all, of the pre-1800 averages for China, Japan, England, and Scandinavia. The global shift toward relatively 
longer-lived females is probably explained largely by the decline in female infanticide and in maternal 
deaths during childbirth.   
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shifts in the e0 curve in Figure 8 and movements along it is important.20 It is far harder to 
argue that shifts in the curve are driven by improvements in living standards than for 
movements along it (Preston 1980; Williamson 1984). While we know a great deal about 
the connections between individual living standards and longevity along the e0 curve 
(Fogel 2004), we know far less about the public health forces accounting for the shift in 
the e0 curve.   
The most dramatic historical shift in international survival rates, however, has 
taken place in today’s developing countries, seven of which are portrayed in Figure 8.  
People in today’s poor countries live much longer than did Western Europeans before the 
twentieth century, at comparable income levels. For example, at the end of the twentieth 
century China had an average life expectancy of almost 70 years, compared with 47 years 
for the French in 1900 who received comparable real incomes. Similarly, Africans south 
of the Sahara survive a bit longer today (e0 = 47 years, even including the impact of 
AIDS), than did the English in the early nineteenth century when they had the world’s 
longest life spans (e0 = 45 years). The global spread of better health care and public 
victories over many pathogens and parasites in the twentieth century created a dramatic 
life expectancy convergence between nations. Thus, we now live in a world where 
nations no longer differ anywhere near as much in life expectancies than they did a 
century ago. What separates nations today is the quality of life, not the length of life 
(Clark 2007, p. 108). What separated them a century ago was both.  
 Group survival rates were always correlated with average incomes in the past. We 
have not yet found any century in which the poor out-lived the rich (apart from episodes 
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 The upward shift over time in the e0 curve was emphasized by Samuel Preston (1980).   
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of civil violence and war), while there are plenty of historical examples where the rich 
out-lived the poor. Thus, in Roman Italy two millennia ago, adult mortality was worse for 
former slaves than for magistrates.21 Several estimates from early modern Europe show 
that aristocrats outlived commoners, especially female aristocrats. The same correlation 
with socio-economic status persists today, both for infant and adult mortality, even in 
countries with comprehensive national health services. While survival rate gaps between 
different socio-economic groups may have been eternal, we lack enough evidence to say 
exactly when they widened or narrowed.   
 Survival inequalities across individuals deserve at least as much attention as 
survival inequalities across classes or nations. History offers two clear insights on the 
issue.  First, inequality among individual lifetime incomes has always been greater than 
inequality among individual annual incomes. Second, the historical trend in the inequality 
of lifetime incomes must have been sharply downward to the extent that those five 
hundred years of improvement in life spans illustrated in Figure 8 were driven in large 
part by improvements in infant and child survival. For example, infant mortality in Africa 
south of the Sahara today is only 10 percent, while it was over 12 percent in the United 
States in 1900 and 17 percent in England in the late eighteenth century.  
People today in modern pre-industrial societies are endowed with much more 
equal life span (and morbidity) chances than were their distant ancestors in ancient pre-
industrial societies. It follows that lifetime-adjusted inequality is a lot less in today’s pre-
industrial societies.    
                                                 
21
 This point has been previously noted by Jackson (1994) and Hoffman et al. (2005). 
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 The trend toward more equal survival rates has an interesting East Asian twist.  
Ancient China and Japan both had higher infant mortality than did the rest of the world, 
but children also had better survival chances after infancy, so that until the late eighteenth 
century overall life expectancy at birth was as good in East Asia as in Europe and even 
England. This demographic fact has had two important implications for the long-run 
evolution of East Asian inequality. First, those suggestions of ancient East Asian 
egalitarianism in Table 2 and Figure 2 were offset by highly unequal survival chances for 
East Asian newborns. Second, the twentieth century convergence in life expectancies was 
more dramatic for East Asia than it was for the rest of the Third World. For example, the 
share of Japanese infants dying in the first year of life dropped from 25 percent in 1776-
1815, to 5 percent in the early 1950s, and to only 0.4 percent today. Ancient East Asia 
has moved from being relatively equal in income, but relatively unequal in life span, to 
being relatively equal in both today.  
 
6. New Inequality Insights and an Agenda for the Future 
 
We conclude by stressing three key aspects of inequality that ancient pre- 
industrial experience has uncovered. First, as measured by the Gini coefficient, income 
inequality in still-pre-industrial countries today is not very different from inequality in 
distant pre-industrial times. In addition, the variance between countries then and now is 
much greater than the variance in average inequality between then and now. Second, the 
extraction ratio – how much of potential inequality was converted into actual inequality – 
was significantly bigger then than now. We are persuaded that much more can be learned 
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about inequality in the past and the present by looking at the extraction ratio rather than 
just at actual inequality. The ratio shows how powerful and extortionary  are the elite, its 
institutions, and its policies.  For example, in a regression using ancient inequality 
evidence (not included in the text) a dummy variable for colony has a strong positive 
impact on the extraction ratio. Furthermore, while a relation between conflict and actual 
inequality has proven hard to document on modern evidence (see Collier and Hoeffler, 
2004), we conjecture that the introduction of the inequality possibility frontier and the 
extraction ratio might shed brighter light on that hypothesis. Third, differences in lifetime 
survival rates between rich and poor countries and between rich and poor individuals 
within countries were much higher two centuries ago than they are now, and this served 
to make for greater lifetime inequality in the past. Fourth, unlike the findings regarding 
the evolution of the 20th century inequality in advanced economies, our ancient inequality 
sample does not reveal any significant correlation between the income share of the top 1 
percent and overall inequality. Thus, an equally high Gini could and was achieved in two 
ways: in some societies, a high income share of the elite coexisted with a yawning gap 
between it and the rest of society, and small differences in income amongst the non-elite; 
in other societies, the very top of income pyramid was followed by only slightly less rich 
people and then further down toward something that resembled a middle class. Why were 
some ancient societies more hierarchal while others were more socially diverse? While 
this paper has focused on inequality description in ancient societies, it has not explored 
the social structure underpinning inequality or its determinants.   
We hope to fill these social structure blanks in a sequel to this paper. In addition, 
the sequel, with an augmented ancient inequality sample, will explore determinants of 
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actual inequality and the extraction ratio. Three forces are likely to explain most of the 
variance in an augmented ancient inequality sample. First, initial resource endowments 
should matter, especially for ancient agricultural settlements. Different endowments 
imply different food crops, and different food crops imply different technologies. Some 
agrarian technologies imply constant returns (rice) and some increasing returns (wheat). 
The difference may matter for the inequality configuration of ancient inequalities. 
Second, whether the country is the colonizer or the colonized should matter. Throughout 
history, colonial powers have ruled by rewarding indigenous elites, not by mollifying the 
masses. Third, a mixture of political and market forces must have been at work, 
especially the former. More political power and patronage implies more inequality. The 
frequent claim that inequality promotes accumulation and growth does not get much 
support from history. On the contrary, great economic inequality has always been 
correlated with extreme concentration of political power, and that power has always been 
used to widen the income gaps through rent-seeking and rent-keeping, forces that 
demonstrably retard economic growth.22 
                                                 
22
 For a theoretical restatement and fresh international evidence on the growth costs of unequal political 
power, see Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (2003).   
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Appendix 1: Data Sources 
Bihar (India) 1807 
 
Expenditure class Percentage of 
population 
Average monthly 
expenditure per capita (in 
rupees) 
Average monthly 
expenditure relative to 
mean 
1 15.24 0.68 0.43 
2 4.85 0.83 0.53 
3 16.18 0.88 0.56 
4 6.68 0.97 0.61 
5 8.52 1.03 0.65 
6 10.39 1.42 0.90 
7 8.91 1.56 0.99 
8 11.21 2.06 1.30 
9 9.89 2.64 1.67 
10 8.13 4.45 2.82 
Total 100 1.58 1 
 
Income distribution data: A household census survey was made by a British official 
(Hamilton) of Patna city and 16 rural districts in the region surrounding it, all of which 
we take to be representative of Bihar. He recorded family size and monthly family 
expenditures in rupees. The data are summarized by approximate deciles (Martin 1838). 
 
Population and area: Population of 3,362,280 and area in km2 from Martin (1838).  
 
Urbanization rate: We use the rate for India (Jean-François Bergier and Jon Mathieu 
2002: Table 1, 9-12% for 1800, based on Bairoch and Chandler). 
 
Mean income in $PPP: 1820 GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars (Maddison 
2001: 264).  
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Brazil 1872 
 
 
Occupational income  
(in milreis per annum) 
Number of people in 
occupation 
Average annual income 
relative to mean 
72 223 0.23 
100 1065836 0.32 
108 1586 0.35 
109 15 0.35 
118 64263 0.38 
120 62662 0.38 
126 140 0.40 
132 15 0.42 
144 14261 0.46 
155 45229 0.50 
157 6736 0.50 
161 239 0.52 
163 426 0.52 
175 677987 0.56 
177 411664 0.57 
178 86 0.57 
179 874 0.57 
180 292066 0.58 
191 150 0.61 
199 261 0.64 
206 1466 0.66 
207 16160 0.66 
208 22 0.67 
213 109 0.68 
214 7 0.69 
215 57619 0.69 
218 60 0.70 
229 142 0.73 
232 272965 0.74 
233 82 0.75 
236 67294 0.76 
237 182 0.76 
240 6717 0.77 
245 2872 0.79 
247 962 0.79 
250 18778 0.80 
251 81 0.81 
255 31 0.82 
262 120545 0.84 
266 623196 0.85 
269 6088 0.86 
270 64280 0.87 
271 1925 0.87 
272 2 0.87 
282 24835 0.90 
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Occupational income  
(in milreis per annum) 
Number of people in 
occupation 
Average annual income 
relative to mean 
283 777 0.91 
286 1305 0.92 
287 321 0.92 
288 35 0.92 
293 69 0.94 
295 10478 0.95 
297 31 0.95 
300 460770 0.96 
306 104 0.98 
309 9423 0.99 
310 54157 0.99 
312 161 1.00 
319 2156 1.02 
323 1671 1.04 
327 1254 1.05 
340 31 1.09 
343 848 1.10 
348 399884 1.12 
350 3236 1.12 
354 179708 1.14 
356 1499 1.14 
359 86 1.15 
360 41102 1.15 
366 1 1.17 
370 2410 1.19 
377 1051 1.21 
379 161 1.22 
383 31 1.23 
387 7699 1.24 
391 1 1.25 
394 8 1.26 
397 620 1.27 
406 4818 1.30 
408 440 1.31 
413 42 1.32 
424 217 1.36 
425 5494 1.36 
431 7091 1.38 
432 706 1.39 
436 15 1.40 
439 856 1.41 
443 33797 1.42 
445 11 1.43 
450 10174 1.44 
459 1181 1.47 
460 69 1.48 
464 81407 1.49 
468 161 1.50 
472 9195 1.51 
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Occupational income  
(in milreis per annum) 
Number of people in 
occupation 
Average annual income 
relative to mean 
475 468 1.52 
476 3 1.53 
479 8 1.54 
480 226013 1.54 
490 3655 1.57 
502 17 1.61 
503 34 1.61 
531 93744 1.70 
533 2078 1.71 
534 180 1.71 
538 597 1.73 
540 1782 1.73 
544 80 1.74 
545 161 1.75 
546 723 1.75 
549 65 1.76 
550 941 1.76 
552 6 1.77 
554 181 1.78 
565 597 1.81 
572 75 1.83 
574 34 1.84 
576 104 1.85 
580 19272 1.86 
585 69 1.88 
586 155 1.88 
587 3 1.88 
591 18874 1.90 
593 7 1.90 
594 659 1.91 
595 4322 1.91 
600 9123 1.92 
612 3003 1.96 
613 35 1.97 
619 3849 1.99 
620 498 1.99 
623 303 2.00 
628 103 2.01 
637 155 2.04 
641 16 2.06 
646 239 2.07 
648 3544 2.08 
650 546 2.08 
654 261 2.10 
658 787 2.11 
659 5 2.11 
663 161 2.13 
664 1214 2.13 
668 75 2.14 
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Occupational income  
(in milreis per annum) 
Number of people in 
occupation 
Average annual income 
relative to mean 
679 31 2.18 
680 6 2.18 
689 802 2.21 
696 28907 2.23 
701 69 2.25 
708 37669 2.27 
709 1878 2.27 
712 3243 2.28 
713 798 2.29 
718 706 2.30 
719 119 2.31 
720 40182 2.31 
722 1 2.32 
732 46 2.35 
750 113 2.41 
753 550 2.42 
763 75 2.45 
764 62 2.45 
768 36 2.46 
771 981 2.47 
774 1925 2.48 
778 61 2.50 
788 31 2.53 
793 1641 2.54 
797 1183 2.56 
815 1287 2.61 
816 2 2.62 
817 1305 2.62 
819 8138 2.63 
820 4024 2.63 
828 1501 2.66 
829 1 2.66 
831 26 2.67 
832 2291 2.67 
840 1419 2.69 
849 248 2.72 
850 354 2.73 
859 75 2.76 
861 239 2.76 
864 1355 2.77 
878 787 2.82 
880 1555 2.82 
885 41939 2.84 
886 3698 2.84 
890 4593 2.85 
899 3272 2.88 
900 70 2.89 
919 394 2.95 
928 9636 2.98 
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Occupational income  
(in milreis per annum) 
Number of people in 
occupation 
Average annual income 
relative to mean 
929 962 2.98 
934 991 3.00 
941 884 3.02 
945 151 3.03 
950 432 3.05 
954 528 3.06 
955 2532 3.06 
956 1006 3.07 
958 4 3.07 
984 335 3.16 
985 8 3.16 
992 556 3.18 
1019 1809 3.27 
1026 155 3.29 
1034 1139 3.32 
1050 787 3.37 
1056 155 3.39 
1062 14715 3.41 
1063 156 3.41 
1068 1261 3.43 
1076 955 3.45 
1077 17 3.45 
1080 737 3.46 
1082 731 3.47 
1088 1 3.49 
1089 30 3.49 
1092 2713 3.50 
1093 671 3.51 
1097 394 3.52 
1098 5 3.52 
1151 502 3.69 
1153 139 3.70 
1160 4818 3.72 
1166 139 3.74 
1173 311 3.76 
1181 8972 3.79 
1182 12 3.79 
1187 65 3.81 
1190 11526 3.82 
1200 103 3.85 
1210 692 3.88 
1223 643 3.92 
1242 214 3.98 
1245 90 3.99 
1246 155 4.00 
1273 31 4.08 
1296 1969 4.16 
1299 36 4.17 
1320 437 4.23 
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Occupational income  
(in milreis per annum) 
Number of people in 
occupation 
Average annual income 
relative to mean 
1327 543 4.26 
1328 2166 4.26 
1349 741 4.33 
1358 31 4.36 
1365 362 4.38 
1386 181 4.45 
1392 2409 4.46 
1417 1731 4.55 
1424 1171 4.57 
1425 26 4.57 
1431 377 4.59 
1436 388 4.61 
1441 104 4.62 
1464 22 4.70 
1466 155 4.70 
1477 569 4.74 
1487 3872 4.77 
1512 813 4.85 
1526 75 4.89 
1558 322 5.00 
1560 254 5.00 
1576 4 5.06 
1587 13 5.09 
1594 1204 5.11 
1600 1984 5.13 
1614 119 5.18 
1631 214 5.23 
1634 522 5.24 
1638 3436 5.25 
1639 335 5.26 
1661 13 5.33 
1662 26 5.33 
1717 151 5.51 
1728 1575 5.54 
1729 69 5.55 
1759 155 5.64 
1771 17197 5.68 
1772 949 5.68 
1780 450 5.71 
1784 630 5.72 
1795 17 5.76 
1799 716 5.77 
1800 451 5.77 
1830 5 5.87 
1868 450 5.99 
1890 42 6.06 
1899 26 6.09 
1908 604 6.12 
1948 502 6.25 
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Occupational income  
(in milreis per annum) 
Number of people in 
occupation 
Average annual income 
relative to mean 
1953 13 6.26 
1970 4 6.32 
1984 246 6.36 
2000 14255 6.42 
2039 164 6.54 
2052 155 6.58 
2077 78 6.66 
2125 300 6.82 
2136 180 6.85 
2153 716 6.91 
2154 51 6.91 
2160 1181 6.93 
2184 904 7.01 
2186 1341 7.01 
2279 123 7.31 
2290 226 7.35 
2362 73 7.58 
2363 285 7.58 
2374 103 7.61 
2379 90 7.63 
2400 1190 7.70 
2457 181 7.88 
2491 90 7.99 
2492 180 7.99 
2500 132 8.02 
2592 787 8.31 
2600 66 8.34 
2656 1852 8.52 
2691 119 8.63 
2732 335 8.76 
2833 100 9.09 
2848 180 9.14 
2862 75 9.18 
2882 35 9.24 
2928 90 9.39 
2953 285 9.47 
2974 1711 9.54 
2975 26 9.54 
3000 5620 9.62 
3053 75 9.79 
3113 540 9.99 
3200 66 10.26 
3229 358 10.36 
3275 362 10.50 
3519 155 11.29 
3541 1371 11.36 
3543 36 11.36 
3560 720 11.42 
3561 13 11.42 
 43 
Occupational income  
(in milreis per annum) 
Number of people in 
occupation 
Average annual income 
relative to mean 
3600 66 11.55 
3906 13 12.53 
3967 78 12.72 
4000 7703 12.83 
4320 394 13.86 
4461 180 14.31 
4675 161 15.00 
4748 78 15.23 
4799 448 15.39 
4800 464 15.40 
5000 1520 16.04 
5312 694 17.04 
5339 90 17.13 
5459 181 17.51 
5856 90 18.78 
5859 13 18.79 
5936 13 19.04 
5948 540 19.08 
6000 3774 19.25 
7119 540 22.83 
7123 39 22.85 
8000 934 25.66 
8784 90 28.18 
8899 90 28.54 
9598 138 30.79 
10000 244 32.08 
10679 270 34.25 
12000 403 38.49 
14000 75 44.91 
14396 64 46.18 
19195 34 61.57 
20000 132 64.15 
23994 22 76.96 
28793 3 92.36 
30000 66 96.23 
33592 35 107.75 
Total 312 1 
 
 
Income distribution data. The occupational data come from the Brazilian 1872 Census. 
The annual incomes by occupation were estimated by the team of economic historians 
Bértola, Castelnovo, Reis and Willebald (2006). The original data include 813 
professional groups. For simplicity they are consolidated in the table shown above: 
different professions with the same estimated income are summed up.  
 
Population and area. Current land area of Brazil. Population from Maddison (2004).   
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Urbanization rate. The 1872 urbanization rate (share of cities 50,000 or greater) is 5.1 
precent, interpolated from Banks (1976).  
 
Mean income in $PPP. From Maddison (2004).  
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Byzantium 1000 
 
Social group Percentage of 
population 
Per capita 
income (in 
nomisma per 
annum) 
Income in 
terms of per 
capita mean  
Tenants 37 3.5 0.56 
Farmers 52 3.8 0.61 
Large landowners 1 25 4.02 
   Rural  90 3.91 0.63 
Urban ‘marginals’ 2 3.5 0.56 
Workers 3 6 0.97 
Traders, skilled craftsmen 3.5 18 2.90 
Army 1 6.5 1.05 
   Urban excluding nobility 9.5 9.9 1.60 
Nobility 0.5 350 56.31 
Total 100 6.22 1 
Notes: Nobility includes civil and military nobility.  The average household size estimated at 4.3 (see 
Lefort, 2002).  
 
Income distribution data. Taken directly from Milanovic (2006: Table 5, p. 465). Rural 
incomes are based mostly on Lefort (2002) who quantifies population shares and  incomes 
of several classes; rural population is divided into tenants (pariokoi); farmers that include 
both landowning peasants and (not very numerous) hired farm workers and slaves working 
on large estates; and large landowners. Urban population is, following Morrisson and 
Cheney (2002), divided into four classes plus nobility (both civilian and military). 
Additional explanations given in Milanovic (2006: pp. 461-8). 
 
Other incomes and wages (for comparison and illustrative purposes):  
 Amount in 
nomisma 
Amounts in terms 
of the estimated 
average annual 
income  
Source 
Heads of themes (administative 
units) annual wage (around year 
900)  
360 to 720 58 to 115 Ostrogorsky (1969, 
p. 246) 
Heads of  the three most 
important themes (around year 
900) 
2880 ~460 Ostrogorsky (1969, 
p. 246) 
Military commanders  144 23 Morrisson and 
Cheynet (2002, p. 
861) 
 
Population and area. For population, see Milanovic (2006, p. 461). It is a  compromise 
estimate (15 million) based on Treadgold (2001), Andreades (1924) and Harl (1996). 
Area: Treadgold (2001, p. 5).  
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Urbanization rate. See Milanovic (2006, p. 461), based on Bairoch’s (1985) cut-off 
point of 5,000 inhabitants.  
 
Mean income in $PPP.  Average income (6.22 nomisma) divided by the estimated 
subsustence minimum (3.5 nomisma), and the latter priced at $PPP 400 at 1990 
international prices. This gives (6.22/3.5*400) mean income of $710 in $PPPs.  From 
Milanovic (2006, pp. 456-7). 
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China 1880 
 
 
Social group Population 
(in 000) 
Percentage 
of 
population  
Total 
income 
(in taels) 
Income as a 
share of total 
income (%) 
Income per 
capita   
(in taels per 
annum) 
Income in 
terms of per 
capita mean 
Commoners 370000 98.0 1821047 74.4 4.92 0.76 
Upper gentry 1050 0.3 380120 15.5 362.0 55.7 
Lower gentry 6450 1.7 247605 10.1 38.4 5.91 
   Gentry 7500 2.0 627725 25.6 83.7 12.9 
Total 377500 100 2448772 100 6.5 1 
 
Income distribution data. The calculations are based on Supplement 2 (“The gentry's 
share in the national product”) from The Income of the Chinese Gentry, by Chung-li 
Chang, University of Washington Press, Seattle 1962, pp. 326-333.  
 
Gentry per capita incomes. The supplement provides a careful breakdown of 
gentry incomes by different sources, division of these income sources between upper and 
lower gentry, and the population shares of both types of gentry (see the table below 
which is derived from Chang’s Supplement 2). The rest of the book gives the data on 
Chinese GDP and taxes from which one can calculate total household disposable income, 
and when combining this information with the estimates of gentry total income and its 
share in the Chinese population, calculate gentry’s (upper’s and lower’s) per capita 
incomes (see the last line in the table below).  
Main sources of gentry income, according to Chang, are:  
 (i) Government office-holding (administration) which was confined to gentry 
only. Income from government jobs provided resources for purchase of land and thus 
income from landownership. Land was a much less important source of income than at a 
similar stage in European history. 
 (ii) Gentry service in local affairs (managerial income); basically local 
administration. 
 (iii) Assistants to officials (secretarial services).  
 (iv) Teaching. Unlike the first three, they are private services. Only higher 
education (teaching) was monopolized by the gentry.  
 (v) Other services include medicine, writing etc. They are of much smaller 
importance. 
 In professions (i) to (iii) actual incomes (as calculated by Chang) were several 
times larger than the official wages. It was a policy to keep official wages low and give 
large premiums (the yang-lien allowance, see Chang p.13). 
 
Commoners’ per capita incomes. Once gentry per capita incomes are derived, 
commoners’ incomes are obtained as the residual (using total household disposable 
income, line d in Table below, minus gentry’s total income, and dividing by commoners’ 
total population).  The estimated commoners’ per capita income of 4.92 taels should be 
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contrasted with the estimated subsistence minimum (based on wage data) which was 
between 5 and 6 taels (Chang). If we consider Maddison's (2004) estimated China GDI 
per capita of $PPP 540 and Chang's average income of 6.5 taels to be the same (as they 
should be), then the subsistence minimum of $400 works out to be  4.8 taels. This 
indirectly obtained subsistence minimum is quite close to the directly calculated one 
(from Chang) of 5 to 6 taels per annum. This further corroborates both the subsistence 
minimum and the average figures.  
 
Derivation of incomes of the upper and lower gentry  
 
 Income shares: Estimated total income 
Source of gentry income Estimated 
amonts (in 
000 taels) 
Upper 
gentry 
Lower gentry Upper gentry Lower gentry 
 (1) (2) (3) (1)x(2) (1)x(3) 
  Office-holding 121000 1 0 121000 0 
  Gentry service 111000 0.18 0.82 20250 90750 
  Secretarial services 9050 0 1 0 9050 
  Teaching 61575 0 1 0 61575 
  Other services 1/ 9000 0.2 0.8 1800 7200 
  Landholding 220000 0.7 0.3 154000 66000 
  Mercantile activity 113600 0.7 0.3 79520 34080 
 Total gentry income  645225   376570 268655 
   plus Imputed rent 30000 0.34 0.66 10200 19800 
   minus direct taxes 47500 0.14 0.86 6650 40850 
(a) Disposable gentry income  627725   380120 247605 
      
(b) China-wide GNP 2781272     
(c) Total taxes 332500     
(d) Household disposable 
income: (b)-(c) 
2448772     
      
(e) Gentry population  
 (in 000 people) 
7500 0.14 0.86 1050 6450 
Disposable income (in tael  
per capita p.a.) = (a)/(e)  
   362 38 
Sources: Gentry incomes, Table 26, page 197. Imputed rent and GDP, p. 326. Number of gentry: p. 327 
(average hopusehold size = 5). Direct taxes: p. 329. Upper and lower gentry shares in total gentry income: 
p. 330. All references to Chung-li Chang (1962).  1/ Upper and lower gentry’s shares for other services 
assumed.  
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Other incomes and wages (for comparison and illustrative purposes):  
Position (1) 
Official wage 
(taels p.a.) 
(2) 
Yang lien(taels 
p.a.) 
(1)+(2) in 
terms of the 
estimated 
overall income 
mean 
Source 
District magistrate 45 1000 ~160 Chang, p.13 
Governor  150 12000 ~1900 Chang, p.13 
Highest level military 
rank* 
605  93 Chang, p.13 
Seventh level military 
rank* 
36  5.5 Chang, p.13 
Highest level court 
official* 
307  47 
Chang, p.35 
Ninth level court official* 54.4  8.3 Chang, p.35 
*/ Wages include income in kind. Note: Yang lien is an allowance paid on top of the official 
wage.  
 
Population and area: Population from Maddison (2004). Area:  Current area of the 
People’s Republic of China plus Taiwan.  
 
Urbanization rate: From Bairoch, De Jéricho à Mexico, NRF, Gallimard, 1985, p. 462. 
Based on population living in towns that are greater than 5,000 inhabitants.  
 
Mean income in $PPP.  From Maddison (2004).  
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England and Wales, 1688  
 
Social group 
 
Number of 
people 
Percentage of 
people 
Income per 
capita (in £) 
Income in terms 
of per capita 
mean 
Temporal lords 8000 0.14 151.5 15.83 
Baronets 12800 0.22 93.8 9.80 
Merchants on land, greater 19584 0.34 66.7 6.97 
Spiritual lords 520 0.01 65.0 6.79 
Knights 7800 0.14 61.5 6.43 
Esquires 30000 0.53 56.3 5.88 
Merchants by sea, greater 16000 0.28 50.0 5.23 
Artisans and handicrafts 26980 0.47 50.0 5.23 
Gentlemen 120000 2.11 35.0 3.66 
Merchants by sea, lesser 48000 0.84 33.3 3.48 
Merchants on land, lesser 78342 1.38 33.3 3.48 
Persons in offices, greater 40000 0.70 30.0 3.14 
Law 56434 0.99 22.0 2.30 
Persons in offices, lesser 30000 0.53 20.0 2.09 
Naval officers 20000 0.35 20.0 2.09 
Military officers 16000 0.28 15.0 1.57 
Clergymen, greater 10000 0.18 14.4 1.50 
Freeholders, greater 192976 3.39 13.0 1.36 
Science and Liberal Arts 64490 1.13 12.0 1.25 
Freeholders, lesser 482450 8.48 11.0 1.15 
Clergymen, lesser 50000 0.88 10.0 1.05 
Shopkeepers and tradesmen 457668 8.04 10.0 1.05 
Farmers 516910 9.09 8.5 0.89 
Manufacturing trades 732883.5 12.88 8.4 0.88 
Common soldiers 70000 1.23 7.0 0.73 
Common seamen 150000 2.64 6.7 0.70 
Building trades 328581 5.78 5.6 0.58 
Laboring people & outservants 997489.5 17.53 4.3 0.45 
Miners 64080 1.13 3.3 0.35 
Cottagers and paupers 1017845 17.89 2.0 0.21 
Vagrants 23489 0.41 2.0 0.21 
Total 5689322 100 9.57 1 
  
 
Income distribution data. The source is the Lindert-Williamson revision of Gregory 
King’s social table (available at 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/King1688revised.htm). The data which 
were originally presented on per household basis are transformed on per capita basis 
(each individual is assigned per capita income of his/her household).  
 
Population and area. Current territory of England and Wales. Population: obtained 
directly from King’s numbers.   
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Urbanization rate. Bairoch (1985: Table 13/1, p. 279) gives the year 1700 range (based 
on cities greater than 5,000) to be 13 to 16 percent. For 1688, we have used the lower 
bound of the range (13 percent).  
 
Mean income in $PPP. Obtained by interpolation from Maddison’s (2001, p. 247) 
estimates of  English and Welsh GDI per capita in 1600 and 1700.  An alternative 
calculation based  directly on King’s estimates yield almost the same result. If we take 
the ratio between the mean income from King’s social table (9.6 pounds per capita per 
annum) and the subsistence minimum assumed to be one-third above the vagrants’ 
income (2.7 pounds), we get a mean income which is 3.5 times the subsistence which, 
combined with the subsistence minimum of $PPP 400, yields  an average income of 
$PPP 1400. The interpolation based on Maddison’s data is $PPP 1418.  
 
REFERENCES 
 
Bairoch, Paul  (1985), De Jéricho à Mexico, NRF, Paris: Gallimard.  
 
Maddison, Angus (2001), The World Economy: A Millennial Perspectives, Paris: OECD  
Development Centre. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52 
England and Wales, 1801-3 
Social group 
 
Number of 
people  
Percentage of 
people 
Per capita  
income  (in £) 
Income in terms 
of per capita 
mean 
Temporal peers  7175 0.08 320.0 14.59 
Spiritual peers 390 0.004 266.7 12.16 
Eminent merchants, bankers 20000 0.22 260.0 11.86 
Baronets 8100 0.09 200.0 9.12 
Knights 3500 0.04 150.0 6.84 
Esquires 60000 0.66 150.0 6.84 
Educators in universities 2000 0.02 150.0 6.84 
Warehousemen, wholesale 3000 0.03 133.3 6.08 
Manufacturers 150000 1.66 133.3 6.08 
Building & repairing ships 1800 0.02 116.7 5.32 
Higher civil offices 14000 0.15 114.3 5.21 
Lesser merchants, by sea 91000 1.01 114.3 5.21 
Shipowners, freight 25000 0.28 100.0 4.56 
Gents 160000 1.77 87.5 3.99 
Eminent clergymen 6000 0.07 83.3 3.80 
Law, judges to clerks 55000 0.61 70.0 3.19 
Liberal arts and sciences 81500 0.90 52.0 2.37 
Keeping houses for lunatics 400 0.004 50.0 2.28 
Theatrical pursuits 4000 0.04 50.0 2.28 
Lesser offices 52500 0.58 40.0 1.82 
Engineers, surveyors, etc. 25000 0.28 40.0 1.82 
Merchant service 49393 0.55 40.0 1.82 
Marines and seamen 52906 0.58 38.0 1.73 
Freeholders, greater 220000 2.43 36.4 1.66 
Shopkeepers and tradesmen 372500 4.11 30.0 1.37 
Tailors, milliners, etc. 125000 1.38 30.0 1.37 
Confined lunatics 2500 0.03 30.0 1.37 
Naval officers 35000 0.39 29.8 1.36 
Common soldiers 121985 1.35 29.0 1.32 
Military officers 65320 0.72 27.8 1.27 
Education of Youth 120000 1.33 25.0 1.14 
Lesser clergymen 50000 0.55 24.0 1.09 
Dissenting clergy, itinerants 12500 0.14 24.0 1.09 
Farmers 960000 10.60 20.0 0.91 
Innkeepers and publicans 250000 2.76 20.0 0.91 
Freeholders, lesser 600000 6.63 18.0 0.82 
Clerks and shopmen 300000 3.31 15.0 0.68 
Artisans, mechanics, laborers 2005767 22.16 12.2 0.56 
Vagrants 175218 1.94 10.0 0.46 
Laborers in mines, canals 180000 1.99 8.9 0.41 
Hawkers, pedlars, duffers 4000 0.04 8.0 0.36 
Laborers in husbandry 1530000 16.90 6.9 0.31 
Persons imprisoned for debt 10000 0.11 6.0 0.27 
Paupers 1040716 11.50 2.5 0.11 
Total 9053170 100 21.93 1 
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Income distribution data. Based on Colquhoun 1801-3 social table revised by Lindert 
and Williamson. Available at 
http://www.econ.ucdavis.edu/faculty/fzlinder/Colquhoun180103.htm. The data which 
were originally presented on per household basis are transformed on per capita basis 
(each individual is assigned per capita income of his/her household).  
 
Population and area. Current territory of England and Wales. Population:  As obtained 
directly from Colquhoun (coincides within 1 percent with the population for year 1800 
from Maddison, 2001).  
 
Urbanization rate.  Estimated from Allen (2003, Figure 9, p. 428). 
 
Mean income in $PPP.  Maddison (2001) for year 1800.  
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Holland 1561 and 1732 
 
Income distribution data: The rental values of all dwellings (including the poor) were 
taxed. We know that dwelling rents were highly correlated with income (Williamson 
1985; van den Berg and van Zanden, 1988: pp. 193-215), but we also know that the 
elasticity of rents to income was less than one (between 0.72 and 0.75 in 1852-1910 
Britain: Williamson 1985, p. 225). Thus, income inequality should be understated by 
rental values. With that understood, the source of the Dutch data is van Zanden (1995). 
We have not yet been able to secure the underlying distribution data from the author. 
 
Population and area: Population is interpolated between 1500 and 1600 (983,176), and 
between 1700 and 1820 (2,002.783), from Maddison (2001). We approximate the area of 
21,680 km2 to be modern Holland. 
 
Urbanization rate: For 1561, the urbanization estimate (45%) is from van Bavel and van 
Zanden (2004). For 1732, the urbanization estimate (39%) is from de Vries (1985).  
 
Mean income in $PPP: GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars interpolated 
between 1500 and 1600, and between 1700 and 1820, from Maddison (2001: p. 264).  
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India (Moghul) around 1750, and India (British) 1947 
 
India–at the end of the Moghul  rule (around 1750)  
 
Social group Percentage of 
population 
Percentage of 
total income 
Income in terms 
of per capita 
mean  
Nobility, zamindars 1 15 15.0 
Merchants to sweepers 17 37 2.2 
Village economy 72 45 0.6 
Tribal economy 10 3 0.3 
Total 100 100 1 
 
India–at the end of the British rule (1947)  
 
Social group Percentage of 
population 
Percentage of 
total income 
Income in terms of 
per capita mean  
British officials, traders 0.06 5 83.3 
Nobility, Indian capitalists 0.94 9 9.6 
Petty traders, govt & industrial 
workers 17 30 1.8 
Village rentiers 9 20 2.2 
Working land proprietors 20 18 0.9 
Sharecroppers, tenants 29 12 0.4 
Landless peasants 17 4 0.2 
Tribal economy 7 2 0.3 
Total 100 100 1 
Note: Zemandars are large landowners. The data refer to the entire Indian subcontinent (today’s India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh).  
 
Income distribution data. The source of both  data is Maddison (2002) which is turn 
based on Maddison (1971: pp. 33 and 69). Maddison (2002) gives only population and 
income shares, but if we combine this information with Maddison’s own estimates of 
GDI per capita for India (see below), we can calculate $PPP income estimates for each 
social group. Indian Moghul data present a particular problem because there are only 4 
social classes given. Since their incomes are vastly different, and the largest group (72 
percent; village economy) is in the middle of income distribution, probably spanning 
people with very different incomes, Gini2 is unusually some 27 percent higher than the 
minimum Gini (G2 is 48.9 vs. Gini minimum 38.5).23   
 
Discussion: Note that a part (but only a part) of high Indian inequality around the time of 
the independence from Great Britain is caused by very high incomes of the British in 
India. According to Maddison, 0.06 percent of the population (British officials and 
businessmen) received 5 percent of total income which made their average per capita 
income more than $PPP 51,000 per year (and would place them in the top 5 percent of 
                                                 
23
 For the definitions of  G1 and G2, see the main text. 
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today’s US income distribution). Yet, despite these incomes being extravagantly high, 
this is only a part of the story since Gini without the British is still at a rather high level of  
45 (as opposed to 48-49 with them). Consequently, the main cause of the very high 
inequality is a very low income level of the poor classes (a point discussed in the main 
text with regard to the appropriateness or not of using the subsistence minimum of $PPP 
400).  
 
One can also compare the without-the-British inequality in India in 1947 to the inequality 
results derived from the first Indian National Sample Survey (NSS) conducted in 1951. 
The expenditure-based NSS Gini is only 36.24 So—(1) are expenditures significantly 
more equally distributed, compared to income, than we would expect (a conventional 
adjustment, suggested by Li, Squire and Zou (1998), is 5 to 6 Gini points while here the 
difference is 9 Gini points),25 or (2) is Maddison overestimating India’s 1947 inequality; 
or (3) is he underestimating income of India’s poor, or (4) did inequality go down by 
several Gini points between the end of the British raj and 1951?   
 
Population and area. The Indian population in 1750 is estimated from Maddison (2003: 
appendix HS-8, Table 8a, p. 256). Interpolation based on the data for 1700 and 1820. The 
population for 1947 is taken directly from Maddison (2003). For both dates, the area 
includes the entire Indian subcontinent (today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh).  
 
Urbanization rate. For 1750, from Bergier and Matthieu (2002: Table 1, original 
sources given there).  Obtained by interpolation from the urbanization rates of the Indian 
subcontinent of  11-13 % in 1700 and  9-12% in 1800. The paper available at 
http://eh.net/XIIICongress/cd/papers/33BergierMathieu422.pdf#search=%22urbanization
%20rate%20british%20india%22.  For 1947, obtained as interpolation between the 
urbanization rate of 14.1% in 1941 and 17.6% in 1951; see Mohan (1985: Table 1, p. 
621).  
 
Mean income in $PPP.  From Maddison (2004), “World population, GDP and per capita 
GDP, 1-2000 AD”, available at http://www.ggdc.net/Maddison/content.shtml. For around 
1750, we assume the same income as in 1820 (the first year in Maddison’s series). For 
1947, the value is taken directly from Maddison (2004).  
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Kingdom of Naples 1811 
 
 
Income 
Class 
Percentage of 
population 
Income per 
family 
(in ducats) 
Income per capita 
(in ducats pa) 
Income in terms of 
per capita  mean 
1 10 200 38 0.58 
2 10 230 44 0.67 
3 10 260 50 0.75 
4 10 260 50 0.75 
5 10 260 50 0.75 
6 10 260 50 0.75 
7 10 260 50 0.75 
8 10 260 50 0.75 
9 10 260 50 0.75 
10 6 600 114 1.74 
11 3.3 1500 286 4.34 
12 0.7 5000 952 14.47 
Total 100  65.8 1 
Note: Average household size (5.25) assumed to be the same across all income groups 
 
Income distribution data. The source is Malanima (2006: p. 31), who uses the tax census 
data from 1811. This tax census is, for the purposes of establishing an estimate of income 
distribution, better than others because it surveyed not only tax paying units but also the 
poor (the indigent). Each of the 14 provinces of the Kingdom was supposed to place 
people in predetermined nine categories, running from the poorest to the richest (by 
family income). The percentage of people placed in each category was “free” (that is, left 
to each village, city etc.) with the only stipulation that not more than one-sixth of the 
population may be placed in the bottom category (the “indigent”) and hence be exempt 
from taxation. The problem is that it imposes an equality of conditions across provinces 
and leads to an underestimation of incomes in the rich areas like Naples-city. For 
example, people with a same income may be placed in category III in Naples and in 
higher category IV in a poorer province. Similarly, the number of poor in Naples (which 
was probably high) might have been underestimated (because of the imposed threshold of 
one-sixth). Yet, with the exception of  the Naples-city (then the third largest European 
city  containing about 6 percent of the total Kingdom’s population), which also displayed 
relatively high inequality,26 income differences between the provinces were too small to 
lead to significant and systematic misplacing of households. The ratio of mean rural 
incomes between the richest and poorest province was less than 1.5 to 1 (and rural 
population accounted for 85% of the total population).27 
 
Another problem is that the authorities in each province might have been tempted to 
underestimate people’s incomes and to push more people into lower classes so that taxes   
                                                 
26
 The Gini given by Malanima (2006) is 53.  
27
 Excluding Naples-city, the same ratio for the urban areas is even narrower: 1.4 to 1 (calculated from 
Malanima). 
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would be minimized. This is reflected in the fact that some 75 percent of families were 
grouped in the second class (just above the indigent; see Malanima 2006, Table 3, p. 9).28  
Malanima, however, revises these original data, uses information about salaries and other 
sources of income, and constructs a new distribution (which we use here) composed of 
nine groups, each consisting of 10 percent of the population, and the top decile divided 
into three groups (see Malanima 2006: Appendix). We thus obtain an income distribution 
composed of twelve groups ranked by their estimated per capita income.  
 
Population and area. Malanima (2006: p.3).  
 
Urbanization rate. Malanima (2006: Table 7, p. 15) 
 
Mean income in $PPP. Obtained as the ratio between the mean income of the Kingdom 
of Naples as calculated from Malanima data (65.8 ducats per capita per annum) and the 
subsistence minimum (31 ducats per capita for a five-member family in rural areas, and 
up to 50 ducats per capita in urban areas). Taking relative shares of urban and rural 
populations (85 and 15 percent), we estimate the subsistence minimum at 35 ducats per 
person annually. Mean income is thus 1.9 times the subsistence. Taking $PPP 400 for the 
subsistence, results in mean income of  $PPP 752. This can be contrasted with 
Maddison’s (2004) estimate of Italy’s 1820 GDI per capita of  $PPP 1117. Since 
Kingdom of Naples was poorer than most of Italy (north of Naples), the difference seems 
plausible.  
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Nueva España 1790 
 
 Percentage of 
population 
  Annual income 
per family 
(pesos) 
Annual income 
per capita 
(pesos) 
Average income  
per capita 
relative to mean 
Spanish upper class 10 1,543 309 6.12 
Mestizo middle class 18 300 60 1.19 
Indigenous peasant 
class 
72 61 12.2 0.24 
Total 100 252 50.4 1 
Note:  Assumed household size = 5 for all social groups.  
 
Income distribution data. In 1813, Manuel Abad y Queipo, Bishop of Michoacán, 
published his Colección. His social tables offer information on: family size; total 
population; three income classes with population shares and income per capita for the 
bottom two (the Spanish upper class 10% ; mestizo middle class 18% at 60 pesos; and 
indigenous peasant class 72% at 12.2 pesos). What is missing to complete the crude size 
distribution is either an estimate of average income per capita for the richest class or an 
estimate of total income for Nueva España as a whole. Our estimates use an average of 
the latter from three sources: Coatsworth’s 240 million pesos in 1800 (Coatsworth 1978 
and 1989); Rosenzweig’s 190 million pesos in 1810 (Rosenzweig Hernández 1989); and 
TePaske’s 251 million pesos in 1806 (TePaske 1985). 
 
Population and area. Population estimate of 4,500,000 from Colección (1813). Modern 
Mexican borders are used to define the area of 1,224,433 km2 since it appears that 
Manuel Abad y Queipo ignored New Mexico and California. 
 
Urbanization rate. Calculated from cities with 10,000 or more inhabitants from von 
Humboldt (1822). 
 
Mean income in $PPP: 1800 GDP per capita in 1990 international dollars (Coatsworth 
2003 and 2005).  
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Old Castille (Spain) 1752 
 
Province Families 
surveyed 
Population Annual 
income per 
family (in 
pesos)  
Annual income 
per capita (in 
pesos) 
Average annual 
income  per 
capita relative 
to the mean 
Villarramiel 94 376 250 62.5 0.26 
Villarramiel 146 584 750 187.5 0.77 
Villarramiel 58 232 1250 312.5 1.28 
Villarramiel 38 152 1750 437.5 1.79 
Villarramiel 19 76 2250 562.5 2.31 
Villarramiel 8 32 2750 687.5 2.82 
Villarramiel 6 24 3250 812.5 3.33 
Villarramiel 1 4 3750 937.5 3.84 
Villarramiel 8 32 5677 1419.25 5.82 
Paredes 364 1456 250 62.5 0.26 
Paredes 395 1580 750 187.5 0.77 
Paredes 68 272 1250 312.5 1.28 
Paredes 21 84 1750 437.5 1.79 
Paredes 17 68 2250 562.5 2.31 
Paredes 6 24 2750 687.5 2.82 
Paredes 8 32 3250 812.5 3.33 
Paredes 5 20 3750 937.5 3.84 
Paredes 39 156 5677 1419.25 5.82 
Palencia 943 3772 250 62.5 0.26 
Palencia 483 1932 750 187.5 0.77 
Palencia 219 876 1250 312.5 1.28 
Palencia 101 404 1750 437.5 1.79 
Palencia 56 224 2250 562.5 2.31 
Palencia 28 112 2750 687.5 2.82 
Palencia 36 144 3250 812.5 3.33 
Palencia 19 76 3750 937.5 3.84 
Palencia 89 356 5677 1419.25 5.82 
Frechilla 56 224 68 16.9325 0.07 
Frechilla 67 268 437 109.1875 0.45 
Frechilla 89 356 594 148.615 0.61 
Frechilla 34 136 866 216.4775 0.89 
Frechilla 26 104 1223 305.8175 1.25 
Frechilla 18 72 1810 452.4175 1.85 
Frechilla 25 100 2460 614.97 2.52 
Frechilla 8 32 3513 878.25 3.60 
Frechilla 5 20 4351 1087.7 4.46 
Frechilla 6 24 5546 1386.543 5.68 
Frechilla 1 4 6918 1729.5 7.09 
Frechilla 5 20 7325 1831.15 7.51 
Frechilla 3 12 9975 2493.75 10.22 
Villalpando 87 348 213 53.20402 0.22 
Villalpando 106 424 341 85.1309 0.35 
Villalpando 46 184 610 152.3859 0.62 
Villalpando 21 84 832 208.0357 0.85 
Villalpando 27 108 1247 311.7407 1.28 
Villalpando 5 20 1683 420.8 1.73 
Villalpando 17 68 2568 641.9559 2.63 
Villalpando 8 32 3559 889.8438 3.65 
Villalpando 2 8 4757 1189.125 4.87 
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Province Families 
surveyed 
Population Annual 
income per 
family (in 
pesos)  
Annual income 
per capita (in 
pesos) 
Average annual 
income  per 
capita relative 
to the mean 
Villalpando 5 20 5509 1377.15 5.65 
Villalpando 3 12 6569 1642.333 6.73 
Total 3945 15780 975.72 243.94 1 
Note: People (and families) ranked by per capita income within each province. Total gives the overall (Old 
Castille) mean. Old Castille is composed of five provinces: Villarramiel, Paredes, Palencia, Frechilla, 
Villalpando. Family size assumed to be 4 throughout.  
 
Income distribution data. Family annual income estimates (in pesos) from five 
locations in the Palencia region, part of what is now Castilla y León: Frechilla (13 income 
classes) and Villalpando (11 income classes); Palencia city, Paredes de Nava, and 
Villarramiel (9 income classes each). These data were kindly provided by Leandro 
Prados, who used them recently in Álvarez-Nogal and Prados de la Escosura (2006), 
which in turn were taken from Yun Casalilla (1987: p. 465) and Ramos Palencia (2001: 
p. 70). 
 
Population and area. Population of 1,980,000 and area of 89,061 km2 are from Lees and 
Hohenberg 1989: pp. 443 and 445). 
 
Urbanization rate. The 1750 estimate from Lees and Hohenberg (1989: p. 443).  
 
Mean income in $PPP. GDP per capita for Spain, in 1990 international dollars 
interpolated between 1700 and 1820, from Maddison (2001: p. 264).  
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Income distribution data. The basis for calculations is provided by Goldsmith’s (1984) 
estimates. Goldsmith provides minimum wealth (census qualification) for the three top 
classes (senators, knights and municipal senators) and an estimate of their mean incomes. 
The problem was that –taking these estimates as given, and assuming that the bulk of the 
working population lived at slightly above the subsistence minimum ($PPP 400)—one 
finds an overall lower mean income than given by Goldsmith and used here (HS 380). 
This is why we introduced, following Goldsmith who spoke of that class but did not put 
any numbers on it, a fourth rich class of “other rich people” who were neither Roman 
knights nor municipal senators (both of which needed to fulfill the census requirements). 
There is no doubt that that “fourth” rich class existed but putting a number on its size and 
average income is obviously difficult. We decided to take as their mean income the 
average of the two other higher classes’ incomes (leaving out as decidedly the richest the 
class of Roman senators). 
 
Notes to the table above 
 
1/ From Goldsmith (1985). Total amount for senators includes HS15 million of 
Augustus’ and Imperial households’ (100 people) private fortune. The censuses, 
according to Goldsmith, were 1 milion for senators and 250,000 for the knights. 
According to Finlay (p. 46), the census for the knights was 400,000 HS. The average 
annual income of senators’ class is calculated to be 15 percent of the census (note: census 
is the threshold) and for knights, 12 percent of the census amount.  
 
2/ Calculated from Clark (p. 676): 225 denarii (1 denarius = 4 HS) plus 50 modii of 
wheat valued at 110 HS (Milanovic, 2006, Table 3). This makes the average wheat price 
2.2 HS per modius. Harl (p. 276) gives modius price range from 8 asses (2 HS) in Egypt 
to 32 (8 HS) in Rome. Temin (2006, p. 138) gives free market price in Rome at 4-6 HS. 
After the huge Rome’s fire in 64, Tacitus (Book XV, Chapter 39) mentions that the price 
of wheat in Rome, due to the sudden impoverishment of the population, dropped to 3HS 
per modius. We select a relatively low price to avoid inflating incomes by using Roman 
prices for the goods that were essentially consumed outside the capital.  
Tacitus (Book I, Chapter 17) quotes soldiers (in year 14) complaining that a 
soldier is worth only 10 asses per day. That would be 2.5 HS per day or 912 HS per 
annum, some 10 percent below our estimate of HS 1010. Tacitus’ number may refer to 
the monetary pay only, i.e., it likely excludes payments in kind.  
Size of the army (250,000) from Temin (2006, p. 147) quoting Goodman (1997). 
Similarly, Walbank (p.19) gives 250-300,000.  
 
3/ Clark (p. 676). The size of the Praetorian guard was 9 cohorts each with 1,000 men. 
 
4/ From Milanovic (2006, Table 4), based on Goldsmith (1984, p. 268) and the amount of 
alimenta paid from the public treasury to boys under 15 years of age.  
 
5/ From Temin (2006, p. 136). We assume that their income was twice the subsistence. 
They are assumed to account for 10 percent of  the urban population.  
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6/ Lowest class according to Temin (2006). We assume their average income to be 30% 
above the subsistence minimum. They account for more than 90 percent of the rural 
population (which in turn accounts for 90 percent of the total population).  
 
7/ Based on Goldsmith (3.5 HS per day times 225 working days). Temin (2006, p. 138) 
gives also the average wage in Rome as 3-4 HS per day (see also Milanovic, 2006, Table 
4 and the sources given there). Wages expressed at  Rome-city prices (see discussion of 
mean income below). Workers are estimated to account for 80 percent of urban 
population.  
 
8/ The legion's commander wage ratio (67 times ordinary soldier’s wage) is given in 
Duncan-Jones (p. 116) who quotes Brunt (1950). The number of legion commanders 
calculated by dividing 250,000 soldiers by the average size of a legion (5,000 men; for 
the average size of the legion, see Duncan-Jones p. 215). 
 
Discussion.  
(1) Slaves and landowners. Slaves are not shown as a separate social category. This is 
because their economic conditions covered practically the entire spectrum of incomes 
(with a possible exception of the very top). Their consumption levels varied widely: they 
ranged from being very rich (owning slaves themselves) to being very poor (mostly 
slaves engaged in mining). Even rural slaves, who were on average worse-off than urban 
slaves,  were not just “all undifferentiated gang laborers; [on the contrary] there are lists 
of rural slave jobs that are as varied as the known range of  urban or household slave 
jobs"  (Temin, no date, p. 8). For the urban slaves, who were more numerous than rural 
slaves, 29 the prevalence of manumission made Roman slavery (unlike that in the 
Americas) an “open slavery”. Schiavone (2000) and Temin (no date) discuss the position 
of slaves and the role of manumission at great length. Similarly, landowners are not 
shown separately as a class since most landowners belonged to the four top classes and 
their incomes from land are included in our totals.  
 
(2) Top of  the income distribution. The estimated Gini of between 37 and 40 might seem 
low in the light of the excesses of wealth in Rome (see Table below with data gathered 
from Tacitus’s Annals) But this extraordinary wealth was limited to a very few people at 
the very top. It is very unlikely that they would be even selected (so few they were) to 
participate in a modern random household survey. Moreover, their extraordinary wealth 
was not out of step with what we observe today. For example, the fabulously rich 
triumvir Marcus Crassus (-115 to -53) whose wealth was estimated at 200 million HS 
(Schiavone, 2000, p.71) and hence his income at HS 12 million per year,30 has more than 
a counterpart in today’s Bill Gates and other super rich. Crassus’s income was equal to 
about 32,000 mean Roman incomes. Using today’s US GDI per capita, the equivalent 
would be an income of about $1 billion per year. But this is an income that is easily made 
by many of today’s hyper-billionaires and yet the overall inequality is not much affected 
by it. Bill Gates’s fortune is estimated at $50 billion which with 5% interest yields $2.5 
                                                 
29
 According to  Schiavone (2000,  p.112), slaves represented 35 percent or more of Italy’s population. And 
Italy was the most urbanized part of the Empire.  
30
 Using the conventional interest rate of 6 percent (see Finley, 1985, p.104). 
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billion per year, i.e., more than twice as much as Crassus—expressed in mean incomes of 
one’s own time and place. According to The Forbes’ Magazine 2007 list of richest 
people in the world,31  four individuals  in the United States have wealth above $20 
billion which would place them around Crassus’s level.  
 
Tacitus (Book XII, Chapter 53) gives the wealth of Pallas, a freedman, at 300 million HS. 
This would have been 50 percent more than Crassus’s wealth. Augustius’ household’s 
private income was estimated (as mentioned above) by Goldsmith at HS 15 million. 
Using the conventional interest rate of 6 percent, it translates into a wealth of HS 250 
million. 
 
Other incomes and wages compiled from Tacitus’ Annals (for comparison and illustrative 
purposes):  
 Amounts in HS Amounts in 
terms of the 
estimated 
average annual 
income (or GDP) 
Source 
Augustus’ donative to each 
pretorian guardsman (year 14) 
1000 2.6 Book I, Chapter 8  
Augustus’ donative to each 
legionnaire and soldier of cohorts 
(year 14) 
300 0.8 Book I, Chapter 8 
Augustus’ donative to people (year 
14) 
43.5 million 0.2% of GDP Book I, Chapter 8 
Tiberius dowry to Agrippa’s 
daughter (year 19) 
1 million ~2600 Book II, Chapter 
86 
Left by the Senate to Senator 
Marcus Piso after his punishment 
(year 20) 
5 million ~13,000 (or 5 
times the 
senatorial 
census) 
Book III, Chapter 
17 
Tiberius’ personal loan to the banks 
(who were suffering from shortage 
of funds; year 33) 
100 million 0.5% of GDP Book VI, Chapter 
25 
Tiberius’ donative after a large fire 
in Rome (year 36) 
100 million 0.5% of GDP Book VI, Chapter 
51 
Maximal lawyer’s fee (year 47) 10,000 26 Book XI, Chapter 
7 
Consular reward for raising a 
pertinent issue in the senate (paid to 
a senator; year 52) 
5 million  Book XII, Chapter 
53 
Nero’s guaranteed annual income 
for Messala (year 58) 
500,000 ~1300 Book XIII, Chapter 
34 
Seneca’s average annual earnings 
(years 55-58) 
75,000 ~200 Book XIII, Chapter 
42 
Nero’s average annual gift to the 60 million ~0.3% of GDP Book XV, Chapter 
                                                 
31
 Available at http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/10/07billionaires_The-Worlds-Billionaires-North-
America_6Rank.html.  
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state treasury (year 61) 18 
Nero’s subsidy to soldiers after they 
crushed Piso’s conspiracy (year 65) 
2,000 5.2 Book XV, Chapter 
72 
Nero’s gift to Lyon (Lugdunum) 
after a big fire (year 65) 
4 million ~0.02% of GDP Book XVI, 
Chapter 13 
Note: Augustus’s donatives refer to the amounts given out at his death.  
Inflation rate was estimated by Temin (2003, p. 149) to have been less than 1 percent p.a,, up to the end of 
the Julio-Claudian era in 69. Thus, later (post-Augustan) incomes ought to be deflated accordingly. 
 
Population and area. Population is taken from Goldsmith (1984: p. 263).  Goldsmith 
also gives the area as 3.3 million km2, while Taagepera (1979: Table 2, p. 125) gives 3.4 
million km2 (for year 1, wrongly labeled as year 0).  
 
Urbanization rate. Goldsmith’s (1984: pp. 272-3) range is 9 to 13 percent with the 
former number “nearer the lower boundary at the beginning of the principate.” (The 
urbanization rate seems to be calculated based on the cut-off point of 2-3,000 people).  In 
addition to Rome, the population of which is conventionally estimated at 1 million 
(Bairoch 1985: p. 115), there were six cities (Carthage, Alexandria, Antioch, Ephesus, 
Pergamum and Apamea) with populations in excess of 100,000 (Schiavone 2000: p. 61). 
Taking their average size to be 150,000, it follows that about 2 million (or almost 4 
percent of the population) lived in the cities that were larger than 100,000.  For the 
urbanization rate, we use a median estimate of 10 percent. 
 
Mean income in $PPP. Obtained by expressing mean income from Goldsmith (HS 380) 
in terms of the subsistence minimum (estimated at HS 180), and then pricing the latter at 
$PPP 400. This yields mean income of $PPP 844 in 1990 prices. In his most recent 
(2007) update (available at http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/) Maddison gives Italian National 
Disposable Income in year 14 as $PPP 806.  
 
Discussion. 
Temin (2003) argues that Goldsmith’s calculation of the mean Roman income is too high. 
However,  there are at least three counterarguments to Temin: (1) his critique of 
Goldsmith’s  calculations is not based on Goldsmith’s methodology (which Temin 
praises) but on Goldsmith’s  apparent use of Rome-based wage rates for the rest of the 
Empire including Egypt where both wheat prices and wages were much lower in nominal 
terms. Temin then uses an average of the two nominal wage-rates, and obtains a 
significantly lower overall Imperial mean income. But that issue can be sidestepped by 
arguing that the Imperial numbers are expressed in Rome-city prices. This is acceptable 
since Temin (2003, p. 19) himself believes that real (wheat) wages in Egypt and Rome-
city were about the same. Thus, Temin’s metrhodology of averaging two nominal wage- 
rates seems faulty.  (2) The level of infrastructural development, urbanization, size of a 
large standing army (almost ½ of a percent of total population), and the point made by 
Schiavone (2000) that regional differences in mean incomes might have been as high as 5 
or even 6 to 1,32 imply that an overall Imperial mean income was unlikely to have been 
                                                 
32
 If there are large inter-regional differences, and even the poorest region is at the subsistence, then the 
overall Imperial mean must be relatively high.  Large regional differences are mentioned by Goldsmith too 
(1984: p. 265).  
 69 
less than HS 380 (as calculated by Goldsmith) which, using the assumptions regarding 
the subsistence minimum, translates into about $PPP 850 (in 1990 prices). (3) There is 
the consistency argument against changing Goldsmith’s mean income while retaining his 
other calculations.  
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Appendix 3: Derivation of top 1 percent income share 
 
Define H(y)=cumulative percentage of people with incomes higher than y (the 
reverse of the normal distribution that cumulates people from the bottom income 
upwards). 
 
 Also H(y) follows a Pareto distribution: 
 
(1) aAyyH −=)(  
 
where a=Pareto exponent. If we do not have individual-level data but income distribution 
tables with grouped data (fractiles of income distribution), then y should ideally be the 
lower bound of the income interval. There are two differences between these 
requirements and the data we have. First, we have only social classes arranged by their 
mean incomes and population shares.  In other words, we have percentages of people 
with an average income and do not know lower or upper bounds of their income ranges. 
Notice that the same problem exists when the data are arranged in deciles and  only mean 
income by decile is available. Second,  there are very likely "leakages"--namely  people 
from lower (mean-poorer) social groups whose actual  incomes are higher and should be 
part of the top (and the reverse). This problem is specific to the type of data we have here. 
These two departures of our data from the usual way income distribution statistics are 
displayed (even in grouped form) should be kept in mind.  
 
Now, let us define G(y) = total income of those with incomes above y divided by 
total population; if it follows a Pareto distribution, then  
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For example, if the Pareto constant is 2, then mean income of those with income greater 
than y, will be 2y. 
 
Using (1) and (2), we can link G(y) and H(y): 
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Write the expression (4) to the exponent  a: 
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where Ko = constant, and we use expression (1).  
 
Now this means that 
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where the constant K=ln Ko 
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The ratio between the change in H and change in G is: 
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Expression (5) is the key relationship that we fit in order to get the Pareto constant and to 
interpolate for the values that we do not have in the original data. For example, in the 
case of Rome we have H1=1.71 and H2=0.29. Now, the H1 people receive 24.4 percent 
of total income. And H2 people receive 6.2 percent of total income. The top 1 percent 
receive the share that is between the two.  
 
Using (2) we find that the share of total income received by people whose income is 
greater than y, s(y), is equal to: 
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where µ=overall mean income.  
 
We can then transform (5) 
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(7) will be the key relationship when we do the estimation: 
 
Thus,  
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From which we find α=4.38.  
 
Now, to find the income share of the top 1 percent, we use (7) again. 
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And thus x=16.13. 
 
We obtain the same result if we do: 
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x
 
 
Note that the data we have here are: (i) the bottom cut-off point (y), the share of 
people above that income level, H(y), and (iii) the share of total income they receive, 
s(y). The cut-off point is crucial. If we have only the means (for each fractile) and the 
percentage of people, we are effectively treating the fractile means as the bottom cut off 
points.  
 
 We can also get the important relationship between the income share and the 
number of people above the income level y. Using (4) and (6), we get  
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If H(y)=1 percent, then s(y)=(a/a-1)(y/µ), where y is the cut-off point above which 
the top 1 percent of the population begins, and µ=overall mean. The ratio y/µ expresses, 
in terms of the overall mean, income level where the top 1 percent of population begins 
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(the 1 percent cut-off point). Going back to the Roman example where we found α=4.38 
and s(y)=16.13, we can readily see that this implies a cut-off point of 12.4.  
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Table 2  
Inequality Measures 
Country/territory, year Gini1  Gini2  Top 
income 
class (in % 
of total 
population) 
Mean 
income 
in terms 
of s 
(s=$PPP 
400) 
Maximum 
feasible 
Gini (IPF) 
Actual 
Gini as % 
of  the 
maximum 
(with 
s=400)* 
Actual 
Gini as % 
of the 
maximum 
(with 
s=300)* 
Roman Empire 14 36.4  39.4 0.004 2.1 52.8 75 61 
Byzantium 1000 41.0 41.1 0.50 1.8 43.6 94 71 
Holland 1561 56.0  1 2.8 64.5 87 76 
England/Wales 1688 44.9 45.0 0.14 3.5 71.7 62 57 
Holland 1732 63.0  1 5.1 80.3 78 74 
Old Castille 1752 52.3 52.5 0.08 1.9 46.3 113 88 
Moghul India 1750 38.5 48.9 1 1.3 24.5 200 113 
Nueva España 1790 63.5  10 1.9 47.0 135 105 
Bihar (India) 1807 31.1 32.8 10 1.3 35.5 135 77 
England/Wales 1801-3 51.2 51.5 0.08 5.0 80.0 64 61 
Naples 1811 28.1 28.4 0.7 1.9 46.8 61 47 
Brazil 1872 38.7 43.3 1.0 1.8 44.5 97 74 
China 1880 23.9 24.5 0.3 1.4 25.9 95 55 
British India 1947 48.2 49.7 0.06 1.5 35.5 141 97 
       
 
Modern comparators 
 
 
    
 
Brazil 2002 
 58.8  10.4 90.3 65 63 
South Africa 2000 
 57.3  11.0 90.8 63 62 
China 2001 
 41.6  8.6 88.3 47 46 
United States 2000 
 39.9  57.8 98.2 41 40 
Sweden 2000 
 27.3  39.2 97.3 28 28 
Nigeria 2003 
 41.8  2.3 55.7 75 63 
Congo, D.R., 2004 
 40.4  1.1 11.0 366 122 
Tanzania 2000 
 34.4  1.4 26.0 133 77 
Malaysia 2001 
 47.9  17.7 94.2 51 50 
 
* Calculated using Gini2 measures unless it is unavailable, in which case Gini1 is used. Modern Ginis, 
calculated from individual-level data from national household surveys, are from World Income Distribution 
database, benchmark year 2002 (see http://econ.worldbank.org/projects/inequality).  
 Source: For ancient societies, see Appendix.  
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Table 3. Estimated top of income distribution 
 Top 1% share in 
total income (in %) 
The cut-off point 
(in terms of  mean 
income) 
Gini coefficient 
Byzantium 1000 30.6 3.7 41.1 
China 1880 21.3 5.6 24.5 
Nueva España 1790 21.1 9.8 63.5 
Rome 14 16.1 12.4 39.4 
India-Moghul 1750 15.0 15.0 48.9 
K. of Naples 18 14.3 5.5 28.4 
India British 1947 14.0 16.9 49.7 
Bihar 1807 11.5 3.8 33.5 
Brazil 1872  11.2 5.7 38.7 
England 1801 8.9 6.2 51.5 
England 1688 8.7 6.1 45.0 
Old Castille 1752 7.0 6.2 52.5 
    
Mexico 2000 11.5 8.0 53.8 
UK 1999  7.0 4.3 37.4 
US 2000 6.6 4.7 40.2 
Italy 2000 6.0 4.2 35.9 
Germany 2000 4.9 3.6 30.3 
France 2000 4.5 3.5 31.2 
Note: Income distributions for Holland not available. All modern countries as calculated from LIS database 
(using disposable per capita income).  The cut-off point indicates the income level (expressed in terms of 
overall country mean) where the top percentile begins. For the modern societies, it is estimated by taking 
the mean income of the 99th percentile and adding 3 standard deviations (of income within that percentile).  
Where available, the Gini is Gini2, otherwise Gini1 (Table 2). 
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Figure 1   
Derivation of the Inequality Possibility Frontier 
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Note: Vertical axis shows maximum possible Gini attainable with a given α.  
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Figure 2  
Ancient Inequalities: Estimated Gini Coefficients,  
and Two Inequality Possibility Frontiers 
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Note: The solid line IPF is constructed on the assumption that s=$PPP400; the broken-line IPF is 
constructed on the assumption that s=$PPP 300. Estimated Ginis are Ginis2 unless only Gini1 is 
available.  
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Figure 3 
Ginis and the Inequality Possibility Frontier for the Ancient  
Society Sample and Selected Modern Societies 
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Note: Modern societies are drawn with hollow circles. IPF drawn on the assumption of s=$PPP 400 per 
capita per year. Horizontal axis in logs.  
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Figure 4 
Inequality Extraction Ratio for the Ancient  
Society Sample and Selected Modern Societies 
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Note: Modern societies are drawn with hollow circles. Horizontal axis in logs. Inequality extraction ratio 
shown in percentages.  
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Figure 5. The top percentile’s income share and the cut-off income level separating it 
from the lower 99 percent 
Byzantium
China
England 1688-PC
Kingdom of Naples
Old Castille
Roman Empire
Bihar
Nueva Espana
India-Moghul
India-British
Brazil
ngland 1801-
0
10
20
30
to
p 
1%
 s
ha
re
 s
ha
re
0 5 10 15 20
cutoff income level
 
 Note: The cut-off point is income level, expressed in terms of country mean income, where the top 
percentile begins.  The two data points for England and Wales (1688 and 1801-3) almost fully overlap.  
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Figure 6. Top five percentiles of income distribution in  
Byzantium 1000, Rome 14, and England 1801-3 
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Note: All data points except for the top 1 percent are empirical. The top 1 percent share is derived using 
Pareto interpolation.    
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Figure 7.  Gini vs the y/w Ratio in an Ancient Sample of Eleven
India 1947
England 1688
Nueva Espana 1790
England 1801
Castille 1752
India 1750
Byzantium 1000
Brazil 1872
Rome 14
Naples 1811
China 1880
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Average Economy-wide Income versus Income of Rural Labor (y/w)
Gi
n
i C
o
e
ffi
c
ie
n
t
``
 86 
 
 
 
 
